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Abstract
I study the location choice of competing shops. A shop can either
be isolated or join a mall. A fraction of consumers is uninformed about
prices and incurs costs to travel between market places and to enter a
shop. The equilibrium mall size is computed for several parameter val-
ues, showing that mall and isolated shops can coexist. Several effects
play a role. Mall shops attract more consumers, but isolated shops set
a higher maximum price. Moreover, numerical evaluations show that
an increase in mall size decreases the average price level and increases
the participation level of uninformed consumers.
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1 Introduction
A city or town of reasonable size usually has multiple hairdressers, multiple
grocery stores, multiple dry cleaners, and so on. Some of those hairdressers
(or grocery stores, or dry cleaners, etc.) are located close to each other,
for instance in a regional mall or in the city center. Others have no close
competitors in their neighborhood, like a hairdresser in a small strip mall.
In this paper I will use the term isolated shop for a shop that has no direct
competitors nearby, whereas a shop that does have competitors nearby will
be called a mall shop. Both types of shops coexist, and one might wonder
how this is possible. At first sight, it seems unattractive to locate next
to some direct competitors in a regional mall. On the other hand, once a
regional mall with strong competition and low prices exists, how can isolated
shops survive?
Most previous research only answers the question of why large malls exist,
see e.g. Stahl (1982a, 1982b), Gehrig (1998) and Konishi (2005). None
of these papers finds the existence of isolated shops. The intuition that
these papers give revolves around the heterogeneity of goods. When goods
are heterogeneous, consumers prefer to visit a mall with a large variety to
increase the probability of finding a good match. This increases the volume
of sales in a mall and makes it profitable to locate together. This effect of
heterogeneous goods is however not the complete story. Even when goods are
heterogeneous and malls are more attractive for consumers, isolated shops
could survive by lowering their price. This does not occur in equilibrium
because of a simplifying assumption that the aforementioned papers make:
consumers can only visit one market place, independent of whether it is
a mall or an isolated shop. Therefore, when a consumer decides to visit
an isolated shop, he or she is stuck there and the isolated shop can ask
a monopoly price. Consumers anticipate this and prefer to go to a mall,
where prices are lower and the choice is greater. Consequently, isolated
shops attract no consumers1 and do not exist in equilibrium.
The current paper presents a three-stage location choice model where for a
large range of parameters mall and isolated shops coexist in equilibrium. In
the first stage shops choose a location that will maximize their individual
profits, in the second stage shops simultaneously set prices and in the last
stage consumers (who only know equilibrium price distributions, not the
realized prices) decide whether and where to search and buy. An important
difference with previous models is that consumers can search different shops
in different market places. For a fraction γ of the consumers, called shoppers,
1Some of the papers mentioned above assume a spatial structure where consumers and
shops are spread along a line or plane. In this case there are some consumers who prefer
the isolated shop because it is much closer to their home than the mall. But because
of the high price and limited choice in the isolated shop, the number of consumers they
attract is very small and generally not enough to make an isolated shop profitable.
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this search comes at no cost. Therefore these consumers search all shops and
will buy at the cheapest shop. The other consumers, called non-shoppers,
incur costs to search in different shops and different market places. There
are costs to travel between market places (travel costs) and there are costs
to enter a shop once in a market place (entering costs). This has important
implications for isolated shops. First, setting a price that is higher than
the expected mall price plus the entering and travel cost is not profitable,
since non-shoppers who initially visited this isolated shop will not buy there.
Instead they will continue to search in other shops. Isolated shops are thus
forced to adjust their maximum price towards the mall prices. Next to
that, there is fierce competition for the shoppers. This gives isolated shops
an incentive to set even lower prices. Because of these two effects isolated
shops attract a share of consumers and can survive in equilibrium.
Mall shops can also survive in equilibrium, even though I assume homoge-
nous goods. Homogenous goods lead to more competition in the mall com-
pared to when goods are heterogenous, but because of the entering costs
that are incurred when searching another shop in the same market place the
mall shops still make a positive profit. Moreover, as will be discussed later
in more detail, mall shops attract more consumers per shop than isolated
shops, especially when the mall is small. This increased sales volume makes
locating in a mall attractive. Thus, even in a setting where variety does not
play a role a mall can exist.
Apart from the joint existence of mall and isolated shops, the current paper
adds some other interesting insights to the literature. First of all, the pricing
behavior of shops has some special features. Mall shops compete for the
shoppers, but have some power over the non-shoppers. The mall shops
balance these two effects by randomizing over prices. For the same reason,
isolated shops also randomize over prices, but they choose a different support
than the mall shops. There is a strictly positive probability, smaller than
one, that an isolated shop sets a price equal to the maximum mall price plus
the travel costs (which in equilibrium equals the expected mall price plus
the travel and entering costs). With the remaining probability an isolated
shop will randomize over a continuous set of prices that is strictly below the
maximum mall price. An isolated shop can profitably set a price above the
maximum mall price because of the travel costs. When a non-shopper is
currently in an isolated shop he or she has to incur entering and travel costs
to visit another shop. When a non-shopper is in a mall shop, continuing
search within the mall is free of travel costs. Therefore, when in an isolated
shop, non-shoppers are willing to pay a somewhat higher price than when
in a mall shop. On the other hand, an isolated shop also sometimes sets
a relatively low price. If this price turns out to be the lowest price in the
market the isolated shop will attract all shoppers. Therefore, setting a low
price is as profitable as setting a high price. Importantly, the expected price
in an isolated shop equals the expected mall price. This ensures that initially
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consumers are indifferent between visiting a mall or isolated shop. The
pricing behavior of isolated shops could be interpreted as follows. Isolated
shops generally set a price above the maximum mall price, but they also
regularly offer a price that is low relative to the mall prices. An isolated
shop will attract non-shoppers who hope to be lucky enough to find a low
price. But even if the non-shopper does not find a low price he or she will
stay at the isolated shop because to continue search the non-shopper has to
incur travel costs.
Another interesting result is that mall shops attract more non-shoppers than
isolated shops. The intuition behind this is fairly straightforward. If isolated
shops would attract many non-shoppers, they would make more profits on
the maximum price in their support than on the lower prices in their support,
which cannot be an equilibrium situation. Put differently, isolated shops
are only willing to randomize over prices when the shoppers are relatively
important for them. For mall shops, the difference between the maximum
and minimum price in their support is smaller and therefore they are willing
to randomize over prices even when they attract many non-shoppers.
A simple consequence of the uneven distribution of non-shoppers over mall
and isolated shops is that mall shops make more profits than isolated shops.
Still, this does not imply that all isolated shops want to join the mall. If
an isolated shop relocates and joins a mall, the mall size increases, which
increases competition in the mall and decreases the expected prices in the
mall. The remaining isolated shops also have to adjust their prices down-
wards, and as a result the profits of both the original mall shops and the
remaining isolated shops decrease when an isolated shop relocates to a mall.
Whether the profits of the relocating shop increase or decrease depends on
the number of consumers that are gained by relocating to the mall and on
the size of the decrease in prices. As the analysis will show, in some cases
it is profitable to join a mall and capture additional non-shoppers, whereas
in other cases the decrease in prices is too strong to make joining a mall
profitable. When the costs of visiting a shop are high, a third effect plays
an important role in the location choice of shops. As in Janssen, Moraga-
Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2005), when the costs to visit a shop are high,
some non-shoppers stay at home and do not buy at all. When this happens
and when more shops locate in the same mall, prices tend to decrease and
the participation of non-shoppers increases. Thus, when an isolated shop
joins a mall it will capture a larger share of non-shoppers and the total
amount of non-shoppers will increase. The joint effect on the sales of the
isolated shop that relocates is so strong that it is always profitable to join a
mall. So for high enough search costs all isolated shops will want to join a
mall and the only possible equilibrium has no isolated shops.
The second paragraph of this introduction already mentioned some previ-
ous work on location choice. Several other papers should also be mentioned.
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First, as far as I know, Dudey (1990 and 1993) are the only papers on loca-
tion choice that also assume homogenous goods. In these models, consumers
can only visit one market place, but once in a mall a consumer can visit all
shops in that mall at zero costs. To make sure mall prices are above zero,
shops compete in quantities. Because consumers can visit only one market
place, and because the largest mall has the lowest prices, all consumers visit
the largest mall and isolated shops do not exist. Wolinsky (1983) is one
of the few papers that assume consumers can visit more than one market
place. Wolinsky however only analyzes conditions under which all shops
locate in the same mall, and does not give any attention to the possibil-
ity of isolated shops. The paper that comes closest to the current paper is
Fischer and Harrington (1996). In their model products are heterogeneous,
consumers can visit more than one market place and once in the mall all
shops in the mall can be visited for free. To keep their model tractable,
Fischer and Harrington however need to assume that consumers expect an
infinite number of isolated shops, even though in equilibrium there is a finite
number of isolated shops. In the current paper, consumers know the (finite)
number of isolated shops beforehand, and act accordingly. Moreover, the
current paper shows that product heterogeneity is not necessary to find an
equilibrium with both mall and isolated shops.
Although not written in terms of location choice, the model of Baye and
Morgan (2001) is closely related to my model. In Baye and Morgan isolated
shops selling a homogenous product have the option to join a platform.
Consumers can at some cost visit their local isolated shop, or they can at
some entrance fee visit the platform. Once a consumer has entered the
platform, he can visit all shops on the platform for free. In equilibrium,
shops randomize between joining the platform and staying isolated. This
result resembles the main result in my paper, but the mechanism driving
this result is completely different. In the setup of Baye and Morgan the
competition in the platform ensures that the probability a shop joins the
platform is strictly below one, while the existence of a profit maximizing
platform owner ensures that the probability a shop joins the platform is
strictly above zero. Next to this, the pricing strategy of the shops and the
searching strategy of consumers is completely different from the equilibrium
outcome in my model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the model. Section 3 analyzes the second and third stage of the model for
two extreme cases. In one case all shops are isolated and in the other case
all shops are located in the same mall. This will build some intuition before
heading on to section 4, which analyzes the second and third stage of the
model for the case with both mall and isolated shops. Section 5 gives some
comparative statics on the results found in Section 4. Finally, Section 6
analyzes the location choice of shops and Section 7 concludes. All proofs
are in appendix A.
4
2 The model
The model has n > 2 shops in the market that sell a homogeneous good.
Production costs are linear and without loss of generality they are assumed
to be zero. As mentioned in the Introduction, the model has three stages.
In the first stage shops choose a location that will maximize their individual
future profits. I assume that only one mall can be formed. One can think
of a town that has one regional mall with ample space for new shops and
several much smaller in-town mini malls that have no space to expand and
accommodate new shops. A shop thus has to choose between locating in the
regional mall, next to some competitors, or locating in a mini mall without
any direct competitors. In the remainder of this paper I will refer to the
regional mall with several competitors as the ’mall’. A mall with k∗ shops
is an equilibrium when none of the mall shops can increase its profits by
leaving the mall and none of the isolated shops can increase its profits by
joining the mall.
In the second stage, the shops choose a price. I explicitly allow for a mixed
strategy that depends on mall size k and on whether a shop is isolated or a
mall shop. Therefore the price strategy of an isolated shop j is denoted by
a price distribution F ikj(p), where F
i
kj(p) is the cdf of the price distribution.
The strategy of a mall shop h is denoted by a price distribution Fmkh(p) The
maximum price is denoted by pikj or p
m
kh and the minimum price by p
i
kj
or
pm
kh
. Note that if isolated shop j (mall shop h) chooses a pure price strategy
with price p∗ the price distribution is given by F ikj(p) = 0 (F
m
kh(p) = 0) for
p < p∗ and F ikj(p) = 1 (F
m
kh(p) = 1) for p ≥ p∗. In the next sections it will
however become clear that there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
In the third stage of the model consumers decide on whether and where to
search and buy. The model has a unit mass of consumers, all having unit
demand and a valuation θ for the product. The consumers are aware of all
the locations of the shops, but they do not know the prices in the shops.
They however form rational price expectations and base their decisions on
these expectations.
There are two different types of consumers. A fraction γ of consumers con-
sists of shoppers who have zero entering and travel costs. As a consequence
shoppers know all the prices and buy at the cheapest shop.2 A fraction
2One could think of shoppers as consumers who obtain a strictly positive utility from
the shopping experience, even if travel expenses are taken into account. For the results it
is not strictly necessary that there are consumers with zero entering and travel costs who
know all prices. The less restrictive assumption that some fraction γ of consumers gets to
know the prices of two or more random shops without incurring entering and travel costs
would be sufficient to obtain the results in this paper. For simplicity I however assume
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1−γ of consumers consists of consumers who incur strictly positive entering
and travel costs. These consumers are referred to as non-shoppers. Non-
shoppers incur entering costs ce > 0 when entering a shop. These costs
are incurred whenever a not previously visited shop is entered and do not
depend on whether a shop is in a mall with several shops or is an isolated
shop. The entering costs are equivalent to the continuation costs in a stan-
dard consumer search model. These costs reflect the time spent in the shop,
finding the product on the shelf, finding the price of the product, waiting
for a shop assistant to help you, etc. Note that positive entering costs are
essential in the model. Without entering costs non-shoppers could without
additional costs search all the shops in the mall. This would drive the mall
prices to zero, and no shop would ever locate in a mall. In addition to the
entering costs, non-shoppers incur travel costs ct > 0 whenever they travel
from their house to a market place or travel between market places, where
a market place can be either a shopping mall with several shops selling the
product or an isolated shop. The travel costs are incurred every time a non-
shopper travels between market places, and therefore are also incurred when
returning to a previously visited shop that is in a different market place than
the market place where the non-shopper currently is.3 The travel costs can
be interpreted as the costs of, say, a bus ticket or petrol costs. The travel
costs ensure that searching h shops in the same mall comes at less costs than
searching h shops spread over different market places. Finally, the analysis
is restricted to values of ce and ct for which ct + ce < θ.
Non-shoppers search sequentially. This means that non-shoppers first decide
on whether to stay at home, visit a mall shop or visit an isolated shop. Let
µk denote the fraction of non-shoppers who decide to visit a shop (active
non-shoppers) when the mall has size k and let 1 − µk denote the fraction
of non-shoppers who decide to stay at home. The fraction µk is determined
in equilibrium. Based on the price found in the first shop, an active non-
shopper decides on whether to search a second shop and whether this second
search will be in the same market place as the first search (if possible) or
in another market place. Then, based on the outcome of the second search,
active non-shoppers decide on whether or not to search a third time and
where the third search will be, etc.
In the analysis below I will derive a subgame perfect equilibrium of the three
the presence of a fraction of consumers with zero entering and travel costs.
3These return costs are necessary to prevent arbitrage. Imagine a situation of one
mall with shops 1 and 2 and two isolated shops, 3 and 4. Now suppose a non-shopper’s
first search was in shop 1 and the second search was in shop 3. If there are no return
costs and the non-shopper would like to visit shop 2 in his third search he could go there
immediately at cost ct + ce, but he could also return to shop 1 at no costs and then visit
shop 2 at cost ce. To prevent such a situation return costs of at least ct are necessary
when returning to a shop in a different market place.
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stage game described in this section. I will focus on symmetric equilibria
in the sense that all shops in the same market place choose identical price
distributions and market places of the same size have identical price distri-
butions as well. Note that identical price distributions do not necessarily
imply identical prices because realized prices could differ from each other.
Because price distributions are symmetric where possible and because I only
consider situations where there is at most one shopping mall I drop the shop
indices j and h in F ikj(p), F
m
kh(p), p
i
kj
, pm
kh
, kji and pmkh. Also, for k = 1 and
k = n I drop the indices i and m because in those cases either all shops are
isolated or all shops are in the mall.
Because shops choose symmetric pricing strategies, non-shoppers a priori
have no preferences over shops that are located in the same mall. Moreover,
non-shoppers a priori have no preferences over the isolated shops. Once a
non-shopper has chosen to visit the mall he will therefore choose a random
shop from this mall. In the same vein, once a non-shopper has decided to
visit an isolated shop he will choose such a shop at random.
3 Two opposite cases: only isolated shops and
only mall shops
Only isolated shops
This subsection gives some results on consumer behavior and pricing behav-
ior of shops when all shops are isolated. In this case each visit to a shop
comes at cost ct + ce, and each return visit to a previously visited shop
comes at cost ct. This model is equivalent to the model in Janssen, Moraga-
Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2005) (henceforth JMW) except for the return
costs, which are absent in the JMW model. It is however relatively easy to
show that the equilibrium derived in JMW also holds in a model with return
costs and in this section I will focus on this equilibrium.4 For the sake of
brevity many details are omitted. See JMW for a more extensive discussion.
One key component of the equilibrium is the so-called reservation price r1,
implicitly defined by ∫ r1
p
1
(r1 − p)dF1(p) = ct + ce.
The reservation price is defined in such a way that non-shoppers will stop
searching as soon as they find a price at or below r1. In JMW the unique
equilibrium has p1 ≤ r1 and therefore I will concentrate on an equilibrium
4Return costs complicate a full analysis considerably and could potentially lead to
multiple equilibria. See Janssen and Parakhonyak (2008) for an analysis of consumer
behavior under the assumption of return costs.
7
with p1 ≤ r1. The derivation of the equilibrium shows that there is only
one equilibrium with p1 ≤ r1, although there could also exist equilibria with
p1 > r1.
Note that p1 ≤ r1 implies that non-shoppers will immediately stop searching
after they visited the first shop. This in turn implies that non-shoppers will
only start searching when θ − Ep1 − ct − ce ≥ 0, with Ep1 =
∫ p1
p
1
pdF1(p).
Because p1 ≤ r1, the definition of r1 can be rewritten as r1 −Ep1 = ct + ce.
This gives that non-shoppers will only start searching when θ ≥ r1. When
θ > r1 all non-shoppers will search and µ1 = 1. This situation will be
referred to as ’full search’ and occurs if and only if ct + ce is below some
threshold C∗. When θ = r1, non-shoppers are indifferent between searching
and not searching, and 0 < µ1 < 1. This situation will be referred to as
’partial search’ and occurs if and only if ct + ce is above C∗ and below θ.
When θ < r1, non-shoppers do not search at all. Note that in that case
shops only sell to the shoppers. This will drive the prices down to zero, and
so θ < r1 can only occur when ct + ce > θ. By assumption, ct + ce < θ, and
therefore at least some non-shoppers will search in equilibrium.
Deriving the optimal pricing behavior of shops is a fairly straightforward
exercise. When all shops set a price at or below r1 it is easy to see that
deviating to a higher price leads to zero profits. Also, if p1 < r1, it would
be profitable to deviate to r1, so in equilibrium p1 = r1. Setting the profit
function pi1(p) equal to pi1(r1) gives the equilibrium price distribution. The
next Propositions summarize.
Proposition 3.1 (Full search equilibrium, µ1 = 1 )
If ct + ce < θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy) then all non-shoppers are active. Non-
shoppers will stop searching as soon as min(p∗, pmin + ct) ≤ r1, with p∗ the
price found in the shop that was last visited, pmin the lowest price found in
previously visited shops (infinite when there are no previously visited shops)
and with r1 defined as
r1 =
ct + ce
1− ∫ 10 11+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
.
Shops randomize over p ∈ [ 1−γ1+γ(n−1)r1, r1] according to the price distribution
F1(p) = 1− (1− γ
γn
r1 − p
p
)
1
n−1 .
Expected profits are given by pi1 = r1 1−γn .
Proposition 3.2 (Partial search equilibrium, 0 < µ1 < 1)
If ct+ce > θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy) a fraction 0 < µ1 < 1 of the non-shoppers
is active, whereas the remaining fraction 1−µ1 of non-shoppers is inactive.
The fraction µ1 is implicitly defined by
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Figure 1: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when all shops
are isolated. This figure is based on 10 shops, 10 % shoppers and a valuation
of the product of 1.
h(µ1) ≡
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)µ1 y
n−1dy =
θ − ct − ce
θ
.
Active non-shoppers stop searching as soon as min(p∗, pmin+ ct) ≤ θ. Shops
randomize over p ∈ [ (1−γ)µ1γn+(1−γ)µ1 θ, θ] according to the price distribution
F1(p) = 1− ((1− γ)µ1
γn
θ − p
p
)
1
n−1 .
Expected profits are given by pi1 = θµ1 1−γn .
Figure 1 shows the expected profits as a function of the search costs ct+ ce.
In this figure, the number of firms n equals 10, γ = 0.1 and θ = 1. With these
parameter values the full search equilibrium holds for ct+ce < 0.073 and the
partial search equilibrium holds for 0.073 < ct + ce < 1. Note that a search
cost value of 0.073 implies that the search costs are 7.3% of the valuation of
the product. The expected profits are plotted for ct + ce < 0.45; for higher
values of ct+ ce the profits are decreasing and when ct+ ce approaches 1 the
profits approach 0.
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Only mall shops
When all the shops are in the same mall non-shoppers incur costs ce+ ct for
the first search, they incur costs ce for every next search and have no return
costs. This model is equivalent to JMW except for the fact that the first
search is more costly than every next search. There is a unique equilibrium,
and once a non-shopper has visited one shop, the analysis is the same as in
JMW. More specific, non-shoppers will stop searching as soon as they find
a price at or below the reservation price rn, which is defined by∫ rn
p
n
(rn − p)dFn(p) = ce.
Note that the righthand side of this expression is ce, instead of ce + ct for
the definition of r1. As in JMW, the unique equilibrium has pn = rn.
The analysis differs from JMW when it comes to full and partial search
equilibria. All non-shoppers will search when θ − Epn − ct − ce > 0. The
definition of rn gives rn − Epn = ce and so all non-shoppers will be active
when rn < θ − ct. A partial search equilibrium occurs when rn = θ − ct.
Note that the travel costs explicitly occur in this expression. This is because
non-shoppers incur travel costs when they search for the first time, whereas
the expected prices (rn − ce) are based on their behavior once they are in
the mall, where travel costs do not play a role anymore.
Note that the maximum price that shops can ask is limited to θ − ct. Intu-
itively, the maximum price a shop can ask is limited to the expected price
plus ce. For a higher price, non-shoppers would continue searching and
the shop setting the maximum price would not sell anything. On the other
hand, the expected price can at most be θ−ct−ce, otherwise no non-shopper
would be active. Combined, this gives that the maximum price can at most
be θ − ct.
The full search equilibrium has the following form.
Proposition 3.3 (Full search equilibrium, µn = 1)
If ce < (1 −
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy)(θ − ct) all non-shoppers are active and non-
shoppers will stop searching as soon as they find a price at or below rn, with
rn defined as
rn =
ce
1− ∫ 10 11+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
.
Shops randomize over [ 1−γ(1−γ)+γnrn, rn] according to the price distribution
Fn(p) = 1− ((rn − p)(1− γ)
nγp
)
1
n−1 .
Expected profits are pin = rn 1−γn .
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The partial search equilibrium is as follows.
Proposition 3.4 (Partial search equilibrium, 0 < µn < 1)
If ce > (1−
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy)(θ− ct) a fraction 0 < µn < 1 of non-shoppers
is active, where µn is defined by
h(µn) ≡
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)µn y
n−1dy =
θ − ct − ce
θ − ct .
Active non-shoppers will stop searching as soon as they find a price at or
below θ − ct. Shops randomize over [(θ − ct) µn(1−γ)γn+µn(1−γ) , θ − ct] according to
price distribution
Fn(p) = 1− ((θ − ct − p)(1− γ)µn
nγp
)
1
n−1 .
Expected profits are pin = (θ − ct)µn(1−γ)n .
Figure 2 shows the expected profits as a function of the search costs ct+ ce.
Recall that the reservation value rn depends only on the continuation costs
of search, ce. Moreover, the decision whether or not to search depends on ct.
Therefore, the expected profits do not depend on total costs ce + ct, but on
ct and ce in isolation. To be able to make a plot of the expected profits as a
function of the total costs ce+ ct I assume that ce and ct are related to each
other in a fixed proportion, that is, ct = β(ct+ ce) and ce = (1−β)(ct+ ce),
or consequently ct = β1−β ce. In the figure, β = 0.8. As before, the number
of firms n equals 10, γ = 0.1 and θ = 1. The expected profits are plotted
for ct + ce < 0.8. For higher values of ct + ce the expected profits decrease
to 0. The figure shows the same pattern as in the case where all the shops
are isolated.
Comparing the two opposite cases
A comparison of the equilibria in the previous two subsections gives some
new and interesting results. It can be shown that for low values of ct + ce
it is more profitable to have all shops isolated, whereas for high values of
ct + ce having all shops in the same mall leads to more profits. There are
two opposing effects playing a role here. First, prices are higher when all
shops are isolated. Second, more non-shoppers are active when all shops are
in the same mall. When ct + ce is low the second effect is either absent or
small, but when ct + ce is high, the second effect is stronger than the first.
Figure 3 combines figures 1 and 2 by showing the expected profits as a
function of the search costs ct + ce in the case where all shops are isolated
and in the case where all shops are located in the same shopping mall.
Again, the number of firms n equals 10, γ = 0.1 and θ = 1. In the figure
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Figure 2: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when all shops
are located in the same shopping mall. This figure is based on 10 shops, 10
% shoppers and a valuation of the product of 1. The travel costs ct are set
at 80% of the total search costs ct + ce
ct = 0.8(ct + ce) and ce = 0.2(ct + ce). The expected profits are plotted for
ct + ce < 0.5.
The figure can be split in different parts. First, when the search costs ct+ce
are small enough (for the current parameter values ct + ce < 0.073) the full
search equilibrium holds in both cases and pi1 > pin. The intuition for this
result is straightforward. By locating together in a single shopping mall
shops decrease the costs to continue search from ce + ct to ce, leading to
stronger competition and lower prices and profits. Second, when the search
costs ct + ce have an intermediate value (for the current parameter values
0.073 < ct+ce < 0.28) the full search equilibrium holds in the case where all
shops are located together and the partial search equilibrium holds in the
case where all shops are isolated. The intuition for this is as before: when
all shops are located together consumers expect lower prices and therefore
consumers are more willing to search. This implies that when all shops
are located together all non-shoppers are active and the expected profits
increase in the search costs ct + ce. When all shops are isolated however
only a fraction of the non-shoppers is active and expected profits decrease
in the search costs ct + ce. When the search costs ct + ce are high enough
the expected profits when locating together are higher than the expected
profits when all shops are isolated. Finally, when the search costs are high
enough (for the current parameter values ct + ce > 0.28) the partial search
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Figure 3: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when all shops
are isolated and when all shops are located in the same shopping mall. This
figure is based on 10 shops, 10 % shoppers and a valuation of the product
of 1. The travel costs ct are set at 80% of the total search costs ct + ce
equilibrium holds in both cases. The fraction of active consumers is however
higher when all firms are located together and this leads to higher expected
profits when all firms are located together.
The pattern shown in Figure 3 does not depend on the specific parameter
values chosen. Name the value of ct + ce where the full search equilibrium
changes into a partial search equilibrium the inflection value. A close look
at Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 shows that the inflection value is always higher
when all shops are located together. It is also easy to see that when in both
cases a full search equilibrium holds, that is, when the search costs ct+ce are
below the inflection value for the case when all shops are isolated, pi1 > pin.
With somewhat more effort it can be shown that pin > pi1 when in both
cases a partial search equilibrium holds, that is, when ct + ce is at or above
the inflection value for the case when all shops are located together. This
gives Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5 Let ct = β(ct + ce) with 0 < β < 1. Then there exists a
number c such that for ct+ ce < c pi1 > pin and for ct+ ce > c pi1 < pin, with
θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γ1−γny
n−1dy) < c < θ
1− ∫ 10 11+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
1− β ∫ 10 11+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
.
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4 The intermediate case
In this section I will investigate the situation where 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 shops
are located together in a shopping mall and the remaining n − k shops
are isolated. Recall that Fmk (p) is the price distribution used by the shops
that are in a shopping mall with k shops, with fmk (p) the corresponding
probability density function. The support of Fmk (p) is defined by all prices
for which fmk (p) > 0. Denote by pi
m
k the expected profits of such a shop and
define rmk as ∫ rmk
pm
k
(rmk − p)dFmk (p) = ce. (1)
The same can be defined for the isolated shops: F ik(p) is the price distri-
bution used by them when k shops are located in the mall, with f ik(p) the
corresponding pdf. The support of F ik(p) is defined by all prices for which
f ik(p) > 0, pi
i
k denotes the expected profits and r
i
k is defined as∫ rik
pi
k
(rik − p)dF ik(p) = ce + ct. (2)
Note that the definition of rmk uses ce whereas the definition of r
i
k uses
ct+ ce. The reason for this is that a non-shopper who is in an isolated shop
and wants to continue search has to incur a search cost ce + ct, whereas a
non-shopper who is in a mall can continue searching in the mall at cost ce.
As before, the reservation prices determine whether a consumer wants to
continue search and moreover determine whether a full search or a partial
search equilibrium holds. As in the previous section, I will concentrate on
equilibria where pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik.
Let xk denote the total fraction of active non-shoppers who decide to first
visit a mall shop and let 1− xk be the total fraction of active non-shoppers
who first visit an isolated shop, with 0 < xk < 1. This implies that initially
each mall shop attracts xkk active non-shoppers, whereas each isolated shop
initially attracts 1−xkn−k active non-shoppers. Note that if xk =
k
n the active
non-shoppers initially spread randomly over mall and isolated shops. It will
be shown later that in equilibrium xkk >
k
n .
The first step in deriving the equilibrium is to specify optimal consumer
behavior. This is quite complex because of consumer choice being so rich.
After one or more searches non-shoppers can decide to buy at the current
shop, possibly return to a previously visited shop (incurring return costs),
continue searching in the mall or continue searching in an isolated shop.
The complete specification of optimal consumer behavior is only used in
the formal proofs of the propositions in this section and to save space the
14
complete specification of consumer behavior is therefore placed in Appendix
B.
The optimal consumer behavior implies that Epik = Ep
m
k , with Ep
m
k the
expected mall price, and Epik the expected price in an isolated shop. Intu-
itively, if Epik < Ep
m
k all active non-shoppers prefer to search in an isolated
shop and mall shops only attract shoppers. Because the number of mall
shops, k, is at or above 2, this drives the prices in the mall shops down to
zero and Epik < Ep
m
k cannot hold. When there are at least two isolated
shops (k ≤ n − 2), the reverse argument holds for Epmk < Epik, showing
that in equilibrium Epmk = Ep
i
k and non-shoppers are indifferent between
first searching a mall shop and first searching an isolated shop. This also
holds when there is only one isolated shop (k = n− 1), but the argument is
less intuitive. Appendix A provides more details. Note that when pmk ≤ rmk
and pik ≤ rik definitions (1) and (2) can be rewritten as rmk = Epmk + ce and
rik = Ep
i
k + ct + ce. This gives the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.1 rik = r
m
k + ct in any equilibrium with p
m
k ≤ rmk and pik ≤
rik.
Recall that we concentrate on equilibria with pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik. The
specification of optimal consumer behavior in Appendix B shows that when
pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik all active non-shoppers will search only once. If a
non-shopper would find a mall price above rmk or an isolated price above
rik he or she would continue searching. Moreover, all non-shoppers will be
active (µk = 1) when rik < θ and only a fraction of non-shoppers will be
active (µk < 1) when rik = θ. Note that if all shops set p
m
k ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik,
deviating to a higher price is not profitable. A deviating shop will not sell
to any shoppers and all the active non-shoppers that it initially attracts will
continue searching. Therefore, a deviating shop will have zero profits. For
p ≤ rmk the profit function of mall shops is
pimk (p) = γp(1− Fmk (p))k−1(1− F ik(p))n−k + (1− γ)µk
xk
k
p.
For p ≤ rik the profit function of isolated shops is
piik(p) = γp(1− Fmk (p))k(1− F ik(p))n−k−1 + (1− γ)µk
1− xk
n− k p.
Assume for the moment that k < n − 1. The profit functions show that
in equilibrium pmk = r
m
k , because for a lower maximum price it would be
profitable to deviate to rmk . Similarly, in equilibrium p
i
k = r
i
k.
5 A standard
undercutting argument also shows that atoms in Fmk (p) are only possible
for those prices p∗ at which F ik(p
∗) = 1. Similarly, atoms in F ik(p) are
only possible for those prices p∗ at which Fmk (p
∗) = 1. Exactly the same
5Note that this implies pik 6= pmk and therefore F ik(p) 6= Fmk (p).
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results on maximum prices and atoms hold for k = n − 1, but the proof is
less intuitive and is placed in Appendix A. Equilibrium expected profits are
pimk = r
m
k
xk
k µk(1− γ) and piik = rik 1−xkn−k µk(1− γ).
Note that for p ≥ rmk
piik(p) = (1− γ)µk
1− xk
n− k p.
This shows that isolated shops will never set a price between rmk and r
i
k and
that there will be an atom at rik. F
i
k(p) should also have some probability
mass below rmk because else the definition of r
i
k as given by (2) cannot hold.
This probability mass is atomless, as well as Fmk (p).
For p ≤ rmk the price distributions can be derived by setting pimk (p) = pimk
and/or setting piik(p) = pi
i
k. Suppose that for all p in [p1, p2] f
i
k(p) = 0 and
fmk (p) > 0. That is, only mall shops set prices in [p1, p2]. Then pi
m
k (p) = pi
m
k
gives
Fmk (p) = 1−
(
(rmk − p)(1− γ)µk xkk
γp(1− F ik(p1))n−k
) 1
k−1
. (3)
Similarly, when for all p in [p1, p2] fmk (p) = 0 and f
i
k(p) > 0 then pi
i
k(p) = pi
i
k
gives
F ik(p) = 1−
(
(rik − p)(1− γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γp(1− Fmk (p1))k
) 1
n−k−1
. (4)
Finally, when for all p in [p1, p2] fmk (p) > 0 and f
i
k(p) > 0 then pi
m
k (p) = pi
m
k
and piik(p) = pi
i
k jointly give
F ik(p) = 1−
(
(rik − p)(1− γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γp
) 1
n−1
(
xk
k (r
m
k − p)
1−xk
n−k (r
i
k − p)
) k
n−1
(5)
and
Fmk (p) = 1−
(
(rik − p)(1− γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γp
) 1
n−1
(
1−xk
n−k (r
i
k − p)
xk
k (r
m
k − p)
)n−k−1
n−1
. (6)
The price distributions thus depend on the supports of Fmk (p) and F
i
k(p). It
can be shown that there are three types of supports.
Proposition 4.2 In any equilibrium with pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik, pmk = rmk
and pik = r
i
k. F
i
k(p) has an atom at p = r
i
k, f
i
k(p) > 0 for p
i
k
≤ p ≤ b and
f ik(p) = 0 for b < p < r
i
k, with b < r
m
k . There are three possibilities for the
support of Fmk (p):
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1. fmk (p) > 0 for b ≤ p ≤ rmk and fmk (p) = 0 elsewhere.
2. fmk (p) > 0 for p
i
k
≤ p ≤ a and for b ≤ p ≤ rmk , with a < b. fmk (p) = 0
elsewhere.
3. fmk (p) > 0 for p
i
k
≤ p ≤ rmk and fmk (p) = 0 elsewhere.
When k = n− 1 only possibility 3 can hold.
Each equilibrium type has a full search variant with µk = 1 and rik < θ
and a partial search variant with 0 < µk < 1 and rik = θ. For k < n − 1
this gives a total of six equilibria and for k = n − 1 this gives a total of
two equilibria. The condition piik(p
i
k
) = piik(r
i
k) gives that in all equilibrium
types pi
k
= rik
(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γ+(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
. In equilibrium type 1 F ik(p) is given by (4) and
Fmk (p) is given by (3). In equilibrium type 2 for p
i
k
≤ p ≤ a Fmk (p) is given
by (6) and F ik(p) is given by (5). For a < p ≤ b F ik(p) is given by (4) and
for b ≤ p < rmk Fmk (p) is given by (3). In equilibrium type 3 for pik ≤ p ≤ b
F ik(p) and F
m
k (p) are given by (5) and (6), whereas for p > b F
m
k (p) is given
by (3).
The price distributions depend on rmk , r
i
k, xk, b and possibly on µk and a.
For each equilibrium type these variables are jointly determined by a sys-
tem of equations. For each equilibrium type this system includes (1), (2),
rik = r
m
k + ct and (for partial search equilibria) r
i
k = θ. On top of this,
equilibrium type 1 has Fmk (b) = 0, equilibrium type 2 has F
m
k (p
i
k
) = 0 and
Fmk (a) = F
m
k (b), and equilibrium type 3 has F
m
k (p
i
k
) = 0. The resulting
systems of equations are too complicated to solve analytically. This implies
that it is impossible to analytically derive the parameter regions in which the
different equilibria hold. Also, analytical expressions for profits, our main
interest, cannot be obtained. In the next sections we will therefore resort to
numerical methods.
Isolated shops randomize over a low price region [pi
k
, b] and a single high
price rik. Because of the shoppers isolated shops are willing to set a price
in [pi
k
, b], but the fraction of shoppers that an isolated shop could attract
should be large relative to the fraction of non-shoppers that an isolated shop
attracts. This is because the difference between rik and b is at least ct. By
setting a price at or below b an isolated shop foregoes profits of at least ct
per consumer, which should be made up by a relatively large increase in
shoppers. Because the number of shoppers is fixed at γ, it should be that
the number of non-shoppers per isolated shop, 1−xkn−k , is small. This, in turn,
affects the profits of an isolated shop. It can be shown that piik < pi
m
k .
Proposition 4.3 In any equilibrium with pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik, 1−xkn−k < xkk
and piik < pi
m
k .
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5 Comparative statics
This section will give some comparative statics results on the equilibria that
have been derived in the previous section, using numerical techniques. Recall
that in section 3 β has been defined as a constant such that ct = β(ct + ce)
and ce = (1 − β)(ct + ce). It can be shown that in all full search equilibria
for 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 the parameter xk only depends on β, γ, n and k, and not
on ct and ce. Moreover, all reservation prices and profits can be written as
ct + ce times some function of β, γ, n and k. The partial search equilibria
for 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 are more complicated, in the sense that xk depends not
only on β, γ, n and k, but also on ct + ce. Moreover, the reservation prices
and profits are nonlinear in ct+ce. This implies that when β, γ, n and k are
fixed, the full search equilibria can be numerically calculated. To calculate
the partial search equilibria, ct + ce also needs to be specified. In this sec-
tion I will therefore concentrate on the full search equilibria; partial search
equilibria will be discussed in the next section.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 give simulation results for the full search equilibria. Table
1 uses a small value of γ; γ = 0.05. Table 2 has an intermediate value of γ
(γ = 0.1) and table 3 has a large value of γ (γ = 0.25). Each table gives
results for different values of k and β and in all tables n = 10. Each table
gives a panel with results on xkk and a panel with results on the reservation
price. For 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, rik is reported. Note that a full search equilibrium
only holds when rik < θ, which translates to ct + ce being small enough.
For k = 1, the tables give the equivalence of rik, r1, and the full search
equilibrium holds when r1 < θ. For k = n, the tables give rn + ct. This is
the equivalence of rik as a full search equilibrium holds when rn + ct < θ.
Proposition 4.2 states that for 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 three equilibrium types are
possible. The simulations suggest that these equilibria do not overlap and
together fill the complete parameter space. In the tables lines denote when
each equilibrium type holds. The equilibria in the upper right corner, for
high β and low k, are of type 1. The equilibria in the lower left corner, for
low β and high k, are of type 3. Note that also all equilibria with k = n− 1
are of type 3. The intermediate equilibria are of type 2.
The tables suggest that xkk increases in β and decreases in k. To understand
this, recall that 1−xkn−k should be such that isolated shops are indifferent be-
tween only serving non-shoppers at a price rik and serving both non-shoppers
and shoppers (with strictly positive probability) at a price in [pi
k
, b]. When
β increases, rik − rmk increases because rik − rmk = ct. This implies that it
is increasingly attractive for isolated shops to set a price rik and sell only
to non-shoppers. To counterbalance this effect, 1−xkn−k should decrease, or
xk
k
should increase.
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To understand the effect of k recall that in equilibrium the expected isolated
and the expected mall prices should be equal. The support of F ik(p) consists
of [pi
k
, b] and rik. The support of the mall prices consists of [b, r
m
k ] and
possibly some prices between pi
k
and b. To ensure that the expected prices
are equal, Fmk (p) should not attach too much probability mass to prices in
[pi
k
, b]. In fact, it can be shown that in equilibrium Fmk (p) < F
i
k(p) for p ∈
[pi
k
, b]. When k increases, an isolated shop gets less isolated competitors and
more mall competitors. This increases the probability that all competitors
set a price above b and therefore increases the profitability of setting a price
b. To counter this effect and make a price rik as attractive as a price b,
1−xk
n−k
should increase, or xkk should decrease.
The effects of β and k on xkk explain why equilibrium type 1 can only hold
for high β and low k. For those parameter values xkk is high, and mall shops
have no incentive to capture all shoppers by deviating to pi
k
. On top of that,
when β is high, rik − rmk is high. To ensure that expected mall and isolated
prices are equal, pi
k
should be strictly smaller than pm
k
.
The tables also suggest that rik decreases in β and k. To understand this,
one first needs to understand the effect of β and k on rmk . Intuitively,
when k increases, the competition in the mall increases, leading to a lower
reservation price rmk . Because r
i
k = r
m
k + ct, an increase in k also decreases
rik. When β increases, ce decreases and ct increases. Equation (1) shows
that rmk only depends on ce, and not on ct. Therefore, when β increases r
m
k
decreases. Because rik = r
m
k + ct there are two effects on r
i
k: r
m
k decreases
and ct increases. The results in the tables suggest that the first effect is
stronger.
When γ increases, it seems from the tables that rik decreases, whereas
xk
k
can both increase and decrease. When γ increases there is a stronger com-
petition for the shoppers. As a result, the isolated shops are less tempted
to ask price rik and the mall shops also prefer lower prices. The tables show
that indeed equilibrium type 1 occurs less often when γ is larger: the mall
shops are more tempted to set pm
k
= pi
k
. Because both types of shops prefer
lower prices, it is no surprise that rik decreases. The effect on
xk
k is twofold.
Isolated shops need to be indifferent between asking the high price rik and
lower prices. When the fraction of shoppers increases, isolated shops are
less tempted to ask a high price, but at the same time the behavior of the
mall shops leads to more competition in the lower price range, making a
high price more attractive. When the first effect dominates, 1−xkn−k needs to
increase and consequently xkk needs to decrease to make sure that isolated
shops still want to ask rik. When the second effect dominates,
1−xk
n−k needs
to decrease and xkk consequently increases to ensure that isolated shops still
want to set a low price. Note that in equilibrium type 1 the second effect is
absent and that indeed xkk decreases in γ.
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Even though a numerical analysis is needed to evaluate the equilibria, it is
possible to analytically derive some limiting results.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
• When β → 0, pi
k
= pm
k
, rik − rmk → 0, F ik(p)− Fmk (p)→ 0 and xk → 1n .
• When β → 1, rmk → 0, F ik(rmk )→ 1 and 1−xkn−k → 0.
• When γ → 0, µk → 0.
• When γ → 1, pm
k
→ 0, pi
k
→ 0, Fmk (p)→ 1 and F ik(p)→ 1
These results are in line with previous consumer search models, see e.g.
JMW. Recall that β determines the relative sizes of ct and ce. When β → 0,
ct → 0 and in the limit consumers only incur entering costs. In that case,
the difference between mall shops and isolated shops vanishes, which leads
to equal price distributions and an equal distribution of non-shoppers over
the firms. When β → 1, ce → 0. In this case, once a consumer is in the mall,
he can visit all mall shops almost for free. This leads to large competition
between mall shops and consequently to prices of almost zero in the mall.
To make mall and isolated shops equally attractive, isolated shops should
set prices to almost zero as well. To make this possible, isolated shops
should attract almost no non-shoppers. If they would attract too many
non-shoppers, an isolated shop could set a price ct and make a profit on the
non-shoppers who visited the isolated shop in the first place.
When the fraction of shoppers, γ, vanishes, firms tend to focus completely
on the captive consumers. This raises prices to monopoly levels, and conse-
quently many non-shoppers drop out of the market. When the fraction of
non-shoppers vanishes, firms compete strongly for the shoppers, leading to
very low prices.
6 Location choice
In this section I will consider the equilibrium location choice of shops. A
mall with k∗ shops is considered an equilibrium when none of the mall shops
has an incentive to leave the mall and when none of the isolated shops has
an incentive to join the mall. Thus, a mall with k∗ shops is an equilibrium
when pimk∗ ≥ piik∗−1 and piik∗ ≥ pimk∗+16. Note that if a mall shop would deviate
and leave the mall, the mall size would decrease by one. Also, if an isolated
shop would deviate and join the mall, the mall size would increase by one.
6Rental costs that differ between locations and relocation costs could easily be intro-
duced, but will only change the equilibrium conditions with a constant.
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β = 0.1 β = 0.4 β = 0.7
pimk pi
i
k pi
m
k pi
i
k pi
m
k pi
i
k
k = 1 - 1.2303c - 1.2303c - 1.2303c
k = 2 1.2123c 1.2041c 1.1587c 1.1251c 1.3720c 0.9249c
k = 3 1.1990c 1.1909c 1.1025c 1.0693c 1.0751c 0.8821c
k = 4 1.1850c 1.1769c 1.0474c 1.0146c 0.9046c 0.8374c
k = 5 1.1710c 1.1629c 0.9935c 0.9611c 0.8012c 0.7448c
k = 6 1.1566c 1.1485c 0.9356c 0.9037c 0.7044c 0.6500c
k = 7 1.1421c 1.1340c 0.8854c 0.8540c 0.6118c 0.5597c
k = 8 1.1274c 1.1194c 0.8333c 0.8024c 0.5215c 0.4721c
k = 9 1.1203c 1.1123c 0.7872c 0.7569c 0.4432c 0.3969c
k = 10 1.1073c - 0.7382c - 0.3691c -
Table 4: Profits for different values of k and β when a full search equilibrium
holds. The number of firms, n, is fixed to 10 and γ = 0.1. For ease of
notation ct + ce is denoted by c. Bold profits indicate an equilibrium.
As mentioned in section 4, there is no analytical expression for the profits.
This implies that there is no analytical expression for k∗. Therefore numer-
ical methods are needed. I will first consider location choice when ct + ce
is small, such that a full search equilibrium holds. As mentioned in section
5, in a full search equilibrium profits can be written as ct + ce times some
function of β, γ, n and k. Table 4 gives the profits in a full search equilib-
rium when n = 10 and γ = 0.1. Three different values of β are considered
and profits are given for every possible mall size k.
When comparing pi1 with pii2 and pi
m
2 note that pi1 can both be below or
above pim2 whereas pi1 is always above pi
i
2. When two shops decide to form
a mall the reservation prices decrease. At the same time, the fraction of
non-shoppers going to a mall shop, xkk , is clearly above
1
n , the fraction of
non-shoppers that a shop attracts when there is no mall. The two mall
shops thus set lower maximum prices but sell more, and the total effect is
ambiguous.7 The isolated shops also set lower maximum prices, but on top
of that lose customers. As a consequence, pii2 < pi1.
Once a mall exists (k ≥ 2), both mall and isolated profits seem to decrease
in mall size. The reason for this again is that the reservation prices decrease
in mall size. For mall shops it is also important that the fraction of cap-
tive consumers, xkk , decreases in mall size. This decreases the mall profits
even more. Isolated shops attract more non-shoppers when the mall size
increases, but this increase in non-shoppers does not offset the lower reser-
vation prices. It does show however in the table that mall profits decrease
faster in mall size than isolated profits.
7Note that xk
k
is larger when β is large and thus the positive effect on mall profits is
more pronounced for large values of β.
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γ = 0.05 γ = 0.1 γ = 0.25
β = 0.1 k∗ = 1, k∗ = 9 k∗ = 1, k∗ = 9 k∗ = 1
β = 0.2 k∗ = 1, k∗ = 9 k∗ = 1 k∗ = 1
β = 0.3 k∗ = 1 k∗ = 1 k∗ = 1
β = 0.4 k∗ = 1 k∗ = 1 k∗ = 1
β = 0.5 k∗ = 1 k∗ = 1 k∗ = 1
β = 0.6 k∗ = 3 k∗ = 3 k∗ = 1
β = 0.7 k∗ = 4 k∗ = 4 k∗ = 3
β = 0.8 k∗ = 6 k∗ = 5 k∗ = 4
β = 0.9 k∗ = 7 k∗ = 7 k∗ = 6
Table 5: Equilibrium mall sizes for several values of β and γ. The number
of firms, n, is fixed to 10.
Once γ, β and n are fixed, a table with profits for different mall sizes is suf-
ficient to find the equilibrium mall size. Take for example the case n = 10,
γ = 0.1 and β = 0.1, which is the left panel in table 4. When no mall exists,
profits are 1.2303(ct+ ce). When a shop decides to deviate and join another
shop, it will make profits pim2 = 1.2123(ct + ce). These profits are below
1.2303(ct + ce) and thus k = 1 is an equilibrium. This is indicated in the
table by bold profits. For 2 ≤ k ≤ 8, it is profitable for a mall shop to leave
the mall: pimk < pi
i
k−1. When k = 9, a mall shop has profits 1.1203(ct + ce).
Leaving the mall would give smaller profits (1.1194(ct+ ce)), so a mall shop
has no incentive to deviate. An isolated shop has profits 1.1123(ct + ce)
and joining the mall would give profits of 1.1073(ct + ce). An isolated shop
therefore has no incentive to join the mall and consequently k = 9 is another
equilibrium (denoted in bold). For k = 10, a mall shop would find it prof-
itable to leave the mall, so k = 10 is not an equilibrium. In the middle and
right panel of table 4 the same analysis gives the equilibria that are denoted
by bold numbers.
Table 5 gives equilibrium mall sizes for different values of β and γ, keeping n
fixed to 10. To understand the intuition behind the results in this table, first
consider the incentives of mall and isolated shops to relocate. A mall shop
that leaves the mall loses some of its captive consumers, but at the same
time it can set a higher maximum price (rik instead of r
m
k ). On its own,
this is not sufficient to leave the mall: in section 4 it has been shown that
pimk > pi
i
k. But when a shop leaves the mall, the mall size decreases. This
lowers 1−xkn−k and increases the reservation prices. This magnifies the positive
and negative effects mentioned before, such that pimk < pi
i
k−1 is possible. For
an isolated shop that joins the mall the effects on profits are reversed. After
joining the mall, the shop attracts more captive consumers than before, but
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the maximum price it can ask is lower. These two effects on their own
would be sufficient to join the mall (piik < pi
m
k ), but once again joining the
mall changes the size of the mall. This will decrease xkk and decrease the
reservation prices. Both of these effects negatively affect the profits of a
deviating isolated shop, such that piik > pi
m
k+1 is possible.
When β is high and k is small, xkk is very high. Intuitively, when the travel
costs ct are large, many consumers prefer the mall. If joining the mall would
not affect the mall size, isolated shops would have a large incentive to join
the mall and capture this large share of non-shoppers, instead of the tiny
share of non-shoppers they capture as isolated shop. As a counteracting
effect, joining the mall increases the mall size and therefore decreases xkk
and the reservation prices. But because xkk is very large from the outset and
1−xk
n−k is very low, an isolated shop can still gain from joining the mall. This
will only stop when the mall size has grown large and xkk is relatively small.
Thus, for high β the equilibrium mall size is fairly large.
When the fraction of shoppers, γ, is large, the only reason for an isolated
shop to join the mall is not so important. An isolated shop will join the
mall when it leads to a large increase in captive consumers, xkk . When γ is
large, many consumers are shopping for the best deal and an isolated shop
cannot gain many non-shoppers by joining the mall. As a consequence, the
equilibrium mall size is smaller when γ is larger.
For small β there are two possible equilibria: k∗ = 1 and k∗ = 9. As
proposition 5.1 shows, when β → 0, the difference between mall and isolated
vanishes, and shops are indifferent about their location.
An equilibrium with k∗ > 1 in general gives lower profits for both firm types
than a situation where there is no mall at all. To understand the intuition
behind this, take a better look at the most right panel of table 4. Starting
from a situation with no mall it is profitable to join two shops. These shops
will attract much more non-shoppers than when they were isolated. But the
remaining isolated shops suffer from this. Because they lose non-shoppers
their profits are much lower than in the case no mall existed. Consequently,
isolated shops find it profitable to join the mall. This drives down the mall
profits to below the level when there were no mall at all, although the re-
sulting mall profits are still higher than the isolated profits in the case of
k = 2.
Thus far, I have only considered full search equilibria. In the remainder of
this section I will also consider partial search equilibria. This equilibrium
type is more complicated to analyze because the profits depend on ct and ce
in a nonlinear way. Therefore, instead of tables, I will provide several plots
of expected profits as a function of ct+ce. Simulations show that the plots of
the profits as function of ct+ ce when both full and partial search equilibria
are considered have the same pattern as in the extreme cases analyzed in
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Figure 4: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when all shops
are located separately and when there is a mall of two shops. This figure is
based on 10 shops, 10 % shoppers and a valuation of the product of 1. The
travel costs ct are set at 70% of the total search costs ct + ce
Section 3. Again, there is a value of ct + ce, called the inflection value, such
that for ct + ce below this value the full search equilibrium holds and above
this value the partial search equilibrium holds. The fraction of active non-
shoppers, µk, is decreasing in ct+ ce and as a consequence the profits in the
partial search equilibrium decrease in ct + ce.
Figures 4 and 5 show the expected profits for several values of k. In these
figures γ is set at 0.1, n = 10, β = 0.7 and θ = 1. Figure 4 depicts pi1, pim2
and pii2 and figure 5 depicts pi
i
2, pi
m
3 and pi
i
3. A first observation is that the
inflection point shifts to the right when k increases. Note that this also can
be inferred from table 2 because the inflection point is simply defined as the
value of ct + ce for which rik = θ. Intuitively, competition will be stronger
when more shops are located in the mall. Therefore, more non-shoppers
will be tempted to search, shifting the inflection point to the right. The
numerical analysis also suggests that for k ≥ 2 µk ≥ µk−1. Intuitively, this
is a consequence of the inflection point shifting to the right. Apart from
this, recall that in a partial search equilibrium rik = θ and r
m
k = θ − ct.
This implies that a change in mall size does not affect the maximum prices
the shops can ask. For an isolated shop, joining the mall therefore gives
more captive consumers (xk+1k+1 >
1
n instead of
1−xk
n−k <
1
n) and increases the
fraction of active consumers µk, at the same time not affecting rik and r
m
k .
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Figure 5: Expected profits as a function of the search costs when there is
a mall of two shops and when there is a mall of three shops. This figure is
based on 10 shops, 10 % shoppers and a valuation of the product of 1. The
travel costs ct are set at 70% of the total search costs ct + ce
Therefore, it seems that for large enough values of ct+ce pimk+1 ≥ piik. Figures
4 and 5 indeed show this. To save space, figures of the profits for k > 3 are
not included in the paper, but they show the same pattern. Thus, for large
enough values of ct + ce, n = 10, γ = 0.1, θ = 1 and β = 0.7 isolated shops
have an incentive to join the mall and the only possible equilibrium is one
that has no isolated shops at all (k = n). Simulations for other parameter
values give the same result.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the incentives of a shop to locate together with similar
shops in a shopping mall. In contrast with the other literature on location
choice, this paper finds that in equilibrium isolated and mall shops can
coexist. The main driver of this result is the assumption of consumer search
costs. Non-shoppers incur costs when entering a shop, as in a standard
sequential search model. On top of that, non-shoppers incur travel costs
when traveling between shops that are not in the same mall, a novel feature
in a sequential search setting. The addition of travel costs implies that
searching in a shopping mall is more attractive than searching isolated shops.
Finally, a part of the consumers are shoppers; they can visit all shops at zero
costs.
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In this setup, isolated shops will not raise their prices too high. If the differ-
ence between the isolated prices and mall prices gets too large, non-shoppers
who initially visited an isolated shop will continue to search. Moreover, by
setting a low price, an isolated shop can attract the shoppers. As a conse-
quence of this, isolated shops attract some share of non-shoppers, which is
a necessary condition for an isolated shop to exist in equilibrium.
The location choice of shops is driven by several different factors. First, mall
shops attract more non-shoppers per shop than isolated shops. This gives
an incentive for isolated shops to join a mall. Second, when an isolated shop
joins the mall, the mall size increases and the number of non-shoppers per
mall shop decreases. This dampens the first effect. Third, isolated shops
can set a slightly higher maximum price than mall shops. This gives a mall
shop an incentive to leave the mall. And, fourth, if a mall shop leaves the
mall, the competition in the mall decreases and consequently all prices in
the market (both mall and isolated prices) increase. These four factors work
in different directions. The numerical results in this paper show that there
is no dominant effect and mall and isolated shops can coexist.
When the search costs are large, there is a fifth effect playing a role. When
the search costs are large, only a fraction of the non-shoppers is active. The
other non-shoppers stay at home and do not buy at all. When an isolated
shop joins the mall, the fraction of active non-shoppers increases, and this
increases the profits of both mall and isolated shops. For high enough search
costs the numerical results in this paper suggest that this effect is so strong
that in equilibrium all shops want to join the mall.
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A Proofs
Proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2
To prove Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 first note that in an equilibrium where
some non-shoppers search a shop will never ask a price above θ. If a shop
would ask a price above θ it would not make any sales and profits would
be 0. Asking a price ct + ce however prevents non-shoppers from searching
further and guarantees a strictly positive profit. Because prices are at or
below θ, a non-shopper who is in a shop can always obtain a non-negative
utility by buying from this shop.
To prove the optimality of the consumer behavior stated in the Propositions
an induction argument will be used. Consider a non-shopper who expects the
shops to price according to some price distribution F1(p) with p ≤ min(θ, r1),
where r1 is defined by ∫ r1
p
(r1 − p)dF1(p) = ce + ct.
Denote by p∗ the price the non-shopper found in his last search and denote
by pmin the minimum price he found in previous searches, with pmin infinite
when there are no previous searches. Let q denote min(p∗+ ct, pmin+ ct). If
the non-shopper has already searched n− 1 shops the utility from buying is
θ−min(p∗, pmin+ ct). If the non-shopper decides to search the nth shop as
well and he finds a price below q he will buy in the nth shop. Else he will
return to a previously visited shop. The expected utility from searching is
given by
U(search) = −ct − ce +
∫ q
p
1
(θ − p)dF1(p) + (1− F1(q))(θ − q).
Note that the utility above holds even when q > θ. For p > θ F1(p) = 1 and
therefore when q > θ the utility above reduces to −ct−ce+
∫ θ
p
1
(θ−p)dF1(p),
which is exactly the expected utility of search in case q > θ. The utility from
searching can be rewritten as
U(search) = −ct − ce + θ − q +
∫ q
p
1
(q − p)dF1(p).
Now suppose that min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1. Then it must be that q > r1.
Using that p ≤ r1,
∫ q
p
1
(q − p)dF1(p) =
∫ r1
p
1
(q − p)dF1(p) = q − r1 +
∫ r1
p
1
(r1 −
p)dF1(p) = q − r1 + ct + ce. This gives that the utility of searching equals
θ−r1 and because the utility of buying immediately is θ−min(p∗, pmin+ct)
searching is profitable for min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1.
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If min(p∗, pmin+ct) ≤ r1 both q > r1 and q ≤ r1 are possible. For q > r1 the
utility of search equals θ− r1 (see previous paragraph) and U(buy) ≥ θ− r1.
Search therefore is not profitable. For q ≤ r1,
∫ q
p
1
(q−p)dF1(p) < ct+ ce and
U(search) < θ−q. Because U(buy) ≥ θ−r1 ≥ θ−q search is not profitable.
So for min(p∗, pmin + ct) ≤ r1 the non-shopper will stop searching whereas
for min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1 he will continue to search.
This shows that the consumer behavior stated in the Propositions is indeed
optimal when a consumer has searched n−1 shops. Now suppose that he has
searched h ≥ 1 shops and that the stated consumer behavior holds whenever
he has searched h + 1 or more shops. Because the consumer expects p to
be at or below r1 the optimal consumer behavior tells him to stop searching
after searching the h + 1th shop. Therefore, after searching h shops, if the
consumer decides to continue searching he expects to search only one more
shop and the utilities of continuing search and of stopping search are the
same as before. After searching the hth shop the non-shopper will therefore
continue his search if and only if min(p∗, pmin + ct) > r1 and the stated
consumer behavior also holds in the case h ≥ 1 shops have been searched.
This leaves the case where no shops have been searched yet. Again, given
the optimal consumer behavior for h ≥ 1, the non-shopper expects to search
only once and the utility of search equals
U(search) = −ct − ce +
∫ min(θ,r1)
p
(θ − p)dF1(p).
When r1 < θ this reduces to −ct − ce +
∫ r1
p (θ − p)dF1(p) = −ct − ce +
θ − r1 +
∫ min(θ,r1)
p (r1 − p)dF1(p) = θ − r1 > 0, so for r1 < θ all non-
shoppers will search. When r1 = θ the expression above can be rewritten as
−ct−ce+
∫ r1
p (r1−p)dF1(p) = 0 and so non-shoppers are indifferent between
searching and staying home.
Before deriving an explicit expression for r1, consider the pricing behavior
of shops. First look at the full search case with r1 < θ. A standard un-
dercutting argument shows that the price distribution has no atoms. For
p ≤ r1 profits are given by
pi1(p) = pγ(1− F1(p))n−1 + p(1− γ) 1
n
Under the assumption p ≤ r1 it must be that p = r1. If p < r1 deviation to
a price r1 would be profitable. This gives that in equilibrium profits equal
pi1(r1) = r1(1− γ) 1n and equating this with pi1(p) gives
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F1(p) = 1− (1− γ
γn
r1 − p
p
)
1
n−1 .
Finally, the minimum price is the price p such that F1(p) = 0. This gives
p = r1 1−γγn+1−γ . Note that deviation to a price below p is not profitable and
that deviation to a price above r1 gives zero profits and therefore is not
profitable as well.
Given F1(p) the reservation price r1 can be derived. Rewriting the definition
of r1 gives r1 −
∫ r1
p pdF1(p) = ct + ce. Rewriting F1(p) gives
p =
r1
1 + γn1−γ (1− F1(p))n−1
and therefore ∫ r1
p
pdF1(p) =
∫ 1
0
r1
1 + γn1−γ (1− y)n−1
dy.
This can be rewritten as∫ r1
p
pdF1(p) =
∫ 1
0
r1
1 + γn1−γ y
n−1dy.
The definition of r1 then finally gives
r1 =
ct + ce
1− ∫ 10 11+ γn
1−γ y
n−1dy
.
The full search equilibrium holds when r1 < θ.
Now look at the partial search case with r1 = θ. A standard undercutting
argument shows that the price distribution has no atoms. For p ≤ r1 profits
are given by
pi1(p) = pγ(1− F1(p))n−1 + p(1− γ)µ1
n
It must be that p = r1 = θ. If p < θ deviation to a price θ would be
profitable. This gives that in equilibrium profits equal pi1(θ) = θ(1 − γ)µ1n
and equating this with pi1(p) gives
F1(p) = 1− ((1− γ)µ1
γn
r1 − p
p
)
1
n−1 .
Finally, the minimum price is the price p such that F1(p) = 0. This gives
p = r1
(1−γ)µ1
γn+(1−γ)µ1 . Note that deviation to a price below p is not profitable.
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The condition r1 = θ defines µ1 and the condition 0 < µ1 < 1 defines the
parameter region for which the equilibrium holds. The definition of r1 and
r1 = θ gives θ−
∫ θ
p pdF1(p) = ct+ ce. Using the same method as before, this
can be rewritten as
θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)µ1 y
n−1dy) = ct + ce
or,
h(µ1) =
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)µ1 y
n−1dy =
θ − ct − ce
θ
,
defining µ1. Note that h(µ1) is increasing in µ1, with h(0) = 0 and h(1) =∫ 1
0
1
1+ γn
(1−γ)y
n−1dy. The condition 0 < µ1 < 1 therefore gives
0 <
θ − ct − ce
θ
<
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)y
n−1dy.
Recall that by assumption θ − ct − ce > 0 and so the only relevant part is
θ−ct−ce
θ <
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γn
(1−γ)y
n−1dy, or ct + ce > θ(1−
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γn
(1−γ)y
n−1dy).
Proof of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4
Once a non-shopper has searched one shop he is in the situation described
by Stahl (1989) with search costs ce and so he will stop searching as soon
as he finds a price at or below rn, with rn defined by∫ rn
p
(rn − p)dFn(p) = ce.
Stahl (1989) also shows that the maximum price is at or below rn. This
implies that non-shoppers search at most once. The expected utility of the
first search therefore is
−ct − ce +
∫ rn
p
(θ − p)dFn(p).
For rn ≤ θ this can be rewritten as
−ct − ce + θ − rn +
∫ rn
p
(rn − p)dFn(p),
which equals θ − rn − ct. Therefore, for rn < θ − ct all non-shoppers will
search and for rn = θ − ct non-shoppers are indifferent between searching
and staying home. For θ−ct < rn ≤ θ searching clearly is not profitable and
for rn > θ,
∫ rn
p (θ − p)dFn(p) < ce and so the utility of searching is strictly
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negative as well.
In a full search equilibrium rn < θ − ct and the profits for p ≤ rn are given
by
pin(p) = p
1− γ
n
+ pγ(1− Fn(p))n−1.
This expression shows that p = rn because else deviation to rn would be
profitable. Equilibrium profits are therefore pin(rn) = rn 1−γn and equating
pin(p) and pin(rn) gives
Fn(p) = 1− ((rn − p)(1− γ)
nγp
)
1
n−1
with p
n
= rn 1−γγn+(1−γ) . It is clear that deviation to a price below pn is not
profitable. The same argument as in the proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2
finally shows that
rn =
ce
1− ∫ 10 11+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy
.
A full search equilibrium holds when rn < θ − ct.
In a partial search equilibrium rn = θ − ct and a fraction µn of the non-
shoppers searches. For p ≤ rn the profits are
pin(p) = p
µn(1− γ)
n
+ pγ(1− Fn(p))n−1.
This expression shows that pn = rn and equilibrium profits are pin(rn) =
rn
µn(1−γ)
n . Equating pin(p) with pin(rn) gives
Fn(p) = 1− ((rn − p)(1− γ)µn
nγp
)
1
n−1
with p
n
= rn
µn(1−γ)
γn+µn(1−γ) . It is clear that deviating to a price below pn is
not profitable. The fraction of searching non-shoppers, µn, is defined by the
condition rn = θ − ct. The same procedure as in the proof of Propositions
3.1 and 3.2 gives
h(µn) ≡
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γn(1−γ)µn y
n−1dy =
θ − ct − ce
θ − ct .
Finally, because h(µn) is increasing in µn the condition 0 < µn < 1 gives
0 <
θ − ct − ce
θ − ct <
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γ1−γny
n−1dy
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where the first part, θ−ct−ceθ−ct > 0, is automatically satisfied because of the
assumption θ − ct − ce > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
For ease of notation, let q denote
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ ny
n−1dy.
For ct+ce < θ(1−q) the full search equilibrium holds both when all shops are
located together and when all shops are isolated. Therefore pi1 = 1−γn
ct+ce
1−q >
1−γ
n
ce
1−q = pin.
Next, I show that for ct + ce > θ 1−q1−βq pi1 < pin. In this case the partial
search equilibrium holds both when all shops are located together and when
all shops are isolated. Define the function g(µ) ≡ ∫ 10 11+ γ
1−γ
n
µ
yn−1dy and note
that µ1 is defined by g(µ1) = θ−ct−ceθ and that µn is defined by g(µn) =
θ−ct−ce
θ−ct . Expected profits are given by pi1 = θµ1
1−γ
n and pin = (θ− ct)µn 1−γn
and therefore pi1 < pin holds if and only if µn > θθ−ctµ1. Using that g(µ) is
strictly increasing in µ this can be rewritten as g(µn) > g( θθ−ctµ1) or
θ − ct − ce
θ − ct >
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γ1−γ
n
µ1
θ−ct
θ y
n−1dy.
Because
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ
n
µ1
θ−ct
θ
yn−1
dy = θθ−ct
∫ 1
0
1
θ
θ−ct+
γ
1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1
dy, pi1 < pin if and
only if ∫ 1
0
1
θ
θ−ct +
γ
1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1
dy <
θ − ct − ce
θ
.
The definition of µ1 gives θ−ct−ceθ =
∫ 1
0
1
1+ γ
1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1dy and so pi1 < pin if
and only if ∫ 1
0
1
θ
θ−ct +
γ
1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1
dy <
∫ 1
0
1
1 + γ1−γ
n
µ1
yn−1
dy
and this always holds because θθ−ct > 1.
For θ(1− q) < ct+ ce < θ 1−q1−βq a full search equilibrium holds when all shops
are located together. This implies that pin =
(1−β)(ct+ce)
1−q
1−γ
n is linearly in-
creasing in ct + ce. When all shops are located separately a partial search
equilibrium holds with pi1 = θµ1 1−γn and g(µ1) =
θ−ct−ce
θ . Because g(µ)
is strictly increasing in µ and θ−ct−ceθ decreases in ct + ce, µ1 decreases in
ct + ce and therefore pi1 decreases in ct + ce. Because for ct + ce < θ(1− q)
pi1 > pin and for ct + ce > θ 1−q1−βq pi1 < pin this implies that there exists a
unique value c with θ(1− q) < c < θ 1−q1−βq where pi1 = pin, with pi1 > pin for
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ct + ce < c and pi1 < pin for ct + ce > c.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Recall that in the model ct+ce < θ and therefore at least some non-shoppers
will search. First assume that rik < r
m
k + ct. Proposition B.4 shows that
under this assumption all searching non-shoppers will first search in an iso-
lated shop. Using Proposition B.3 and using that pik ≤ rik it is easy to see
that the searching non-shoppers will stop searching after their first search
and will buy from the isolated shop they visited. Consequently, shops in
the mall will compete for the shoppers and mall prices will be zero. The
definition of rmk in that case gives r
m
k = ce, a contradiction of the initial
assumption that rik < r
m
k + ct.
For rik > r
m
k + ct all searching non-shoppers will first search in the mall, and
because pmk ≤ rmk they will stop searching after their first search and buy
from the mall shop they visited. In case k < n−1 there are 2 or more isolated
shops and these isolated shops would compete for the shoppers. Isolated
prices would be zero and rik = ct + ce, a contradiction of r
i
k > r
m
k + ct.
To show that rik > r
m
k + ct cannot hold when k = n − 1, a lengthy argu-
ment is required. Here only a brief outline is given; full details are available
on request. First, it can be argued that for rik > r
m
k + ct and k = n − 1
pi
k
≥ pm
k
. The next step then is to derive the equilibrium price distribu-
tions Fmk (p) and F
i
k(p). It can be shown that F
i
k(p) is strictly increasing
for 0 < p < rik. If p
m
k
< pi
k
it thus should hold that F ik(p
m
k
) < 0. But
then piik(p
m
k
) > piik(p
i
k). This shows that an equilibrium with r
i
k > r
m
k + ct
and k = n − 1 has pi
k
= pm
k
. Using this, a full equilibrium can be derived,
including analytical expressions for the two reservation prices rmk and r
i
k.
An analysis then shows that rik ≤ rmk + ct for all relevant parameter values,
contradicting the initial assumption that rik > r
m
k + ct.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
To prove Proposition 4.2 it is convenient first to prove Proposition 4.3. Once
Proposition 4.3 has been established, we can use in the proof of Proposition
4.2 that xkk >
1−xk
n−k .
Proof of Proposition 4.3
First note that
piik = pi
i
k(p
i
k
) = γpi
k
(1− Fmk (pik))k + (1− γ)
1− xk
n− k p
i
k
µk
and
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pimk ≥ pimk (pik) = γpik(1− Fmk (pik))k−1 + (1− γ)
xk
k
pi
k
µk.
Suppose contrary to the proposition that pimk = pi
i
k, implying that r
m
k
xk
k =
rik
1−xk
n−k , or, using Proposition 4.1,
xk
k >
1−xk
n−k . This gives pi
i
k = pi
i
k(p
i
k
) <
pimk (p
i
k
) ≤ pimk , a contradiction to the assumption pimk = piik.
Now suppose contrary to the proposition that pimk < pi
i
k. Note that pi
m
k <
piik implies pi
i
k(p
i
k
) > pimk (p
i
k
) and therefore 1−xkn−k >
xk
k . Moreover, pi
m
k =
pimk (r
m
k ) ≥ pimk (pik) gives (rmk − pik)(1− γ)
xk
k µk ≥ γpik(1−Fmk (pik))k−1. Com-
bining these two inequalities gives
piik(p
i
k
) ≤ γpi
k
(1− Fmk (pik))k−1 + (1− γ)
1− xk
n− k p
i
k
µk
≤ (rmk − pik)(1− γ)
xk
k
µk + (1− γ)1− xk
n− k p
i
k
µk
< rmk (1− γ)
1− xk
n− k µk
< rik(1− γ)
1− xk
n− k µk = pi
i
k(r
i
k),
a contradiction.
Because both pimk = pi
i
k and pi
m
k < pi
i
k are not feasible, it should be that
pimk > pi
i
k, or r
m
k
xk
k > r
i
k
1−xk
n−k . Proposition 4.1 then gives that
xk
k >
1−xk
n−k .
Q.E.D.
Now that Proposition 4.3 has been established, we will continue the proof
of Proposition 4.2.
In the text it is already argued that for k < n − 1 pik = rik and pmk = rmk .
Moreover, for k < n−1 atoms in F ik(p) can only occur when Fmk (p) = 1 and
atoms in Fmk (p) can only occur when F
i
k(p) = 1.
When k = n−1 it is clear that atoms in Fmk (p) can only occur when F ik(p) =
1. Atoms in F ik(p) can only occur when F
m
k (p) = 1. When F
m
k (p) < 1 and
there would be an atom in F ik(p) at price p
∗, mall shops would undercut
p∗ and the isolated shop could increase profits by setting an atom at p∗ + ²
instead of p∗. Concerning the maximum prices, pmk = r
m
k because for p
m
k <
rmk it would be profitable to deviate to r
m
k . Also, p
i
k = r
i
k. If p
i
k < r
m
k ,
then for prices between pik and r
m
k , f
m
k (p) = 0. But then the isolated shop
could profitably deviate to a price slightly above pik. If overlinep
i
k = r
m
k and
there is no atom in Fmk (p) at p = r
m
k then the isolated shop could profitably
deviate to rik. If overlinep
i
k = r
m
k and there is an atom in F
m
k (p) at p = r
m
k
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then the isolated shop could profitably deviate to rmk − ². And finally, if
rmk < p
i
k < r
i
k, deviating to r
i
k is profitable. This leaves p
i
k = r
i
k.
It has already been argued in the main text that isolated shops have no
probability mass for rmk ≤ p < rik and that F ik(p) has an atom at p = rik.
To finish the proof, the supports of Fmk (p) and F
i
k(p) need to be specified
for p ≤ rmk . First note that there are no gaps in [min(pmk , pik), rmk ], where a
gap is defined as a set of prices for which fmk (p) = 0 and f
i
k(p) = 0. If there
would be a gap [p1, p2], then pimk (p1) < pi
m
k (p2) and pi
i
k(p1) < pi
m
k (p2), a con-
tradiction. This implies that for prices in [min(pm
k
, pi
k
), rmk ] either f
m
k (p) > 0
or f ik(p) > 0 or both. The corresponding price distributions have already
been specified in the main text. I will now first show that in equilibrium
pm
k
≥ pi
k
. Second, I will show that when pm
k
= pi
k
and k < n− 1 only equi-
librium types 2 and 3 can hold. And, third, I will show that when pm
k
> pi
k
and k < n − 1 only equilibrium type 1 can hold. Finally, I will show that
for k = n− 1 only equilibrium type 3 can hold.
pm
k
< pi
k
cannot hold.
Suppose that pm
k
< pi
k
. For p ≤ pi
k
pimk (p) = γp(1− Fmk (p))k−1 + (1− γ)
xk
k
µkp.
Because there are no atoms or gaps in Fmk (p) for p ≤ pik, in equilibrium
pimk (p
m
k
) = pimk (p
i
k
). This gives
1− Fmk (pik) =
[
γpm
k
+ (1− γ)xkk µk(pmk − pik)
γpi
k
] 1
k−1
.
Note that piik(p
i
k
) = γpi
k
(1 − Fmk (pik))k + (1 − γ)
1−xk
n−k µkp
i
k
. Plugging in the
expression given above gives
piik(p
i
k
) = (1− Fmk (pik))(γpmk + (1− γ)
xk
k
µk(pmk − pik)) + (1− γ)
1− xk
n− k µkp
i
k
.
Note that piik(p
m
k
) = γpm
k
+ (1 − γ)1−xkn−k µkpmk . I will show that piik(pmk ) >
piik(p
i
k
) and that thus deviation to pm
k
is profitable. First rewrite piik(p
m
k
) >
piik(p
i
k
) as
γpm
k
+(1−γ)1− xk
n− k µk(p
m
k
−pi
k
) > (1−Fmk (pik))(γpmk +(1−γ)
xk
k
µk(pmk −pik)).
First note that 1− Fmk (pik) ≥ 0 implies that γpmk + (1− γ)
xk
k (p
m
k
− pi
k
) ≥ 0.
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Now if 0 < 1−Fmk (pik) ≤ 1, (1−Fmk (pik))(γpmk +(1−γ)
xk
k (p
m
k
−pi
k
)) ≤ γpm
k
+
(1− γ)xkk (pmk − pik). Because
xk
k >
1−xk
n−k (Proposition 4.3) and p
m
k
− pi
k
< 0,
γpm
k
+ (1− γ)xkk (pmk − pik) < γpmk + (1− γ)
1−xk
n−k (p
m
k
− pi
k
). Combining gives
(1− Fmk (pik))(γpmk + (1− γ)
xk
k (p
m
k
− pi
k
)) < γpm
k
+ (1− γ)1−xkn−k (pmk − pik).
If 1−Fmk (pik) = 0, the inequality reduces to γpmk +(1−γ)
1−xk
n−k (p
m
k
−pi
k
) > 0.
Because γpm
k
+ (1− γ)1−xkn−k (pmk − pik) > γpmk + (1− γ)
xk
k (p
m
k
− pi
k
) ≥ 0 this
inequality always holds.
When pm
k
= pi
k
and k < n− 1 only equilibrium types 2 and 3 can hold.
Let pj denote a set of increasing prices, that is, p1 < p2 < p3 < . . .. When
pm
k
= pi
k
there is a p1 > pik such that for p
i
k
≤ p ≤ p1 fmk (p) > 0 and
f ik(p) > 0. Because f
i
k(r
m
k ) = 0, p1 < r
m
k .
Suppose first that for p1 < p ≤ p2 fmk (p) = 0 and f ik(p) > 0. Then p2 < rmk
because fmk (r
m
k ) > 0. Also, for p2 < p ≤ p3, fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) = 0. If for
p2 < p ≤ p3 both fmk (p) and f ik(p) would be positive, then according to (5)
Fmk (p1) < F
m
k (p2). If p3 = r
m
k equilibrium type 2 holds.
A situation with p3 < rmk cannot hold. Suppose that p3 < r
m
k . Using that
1− F ik(p2) =
(
(rik − p2)(1− γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γp2(1− Fmk (p1))k
) 1
n−k−1
one can write Fmk (p1) = F
m
k (p2) as g(p1) = g(p2), with
g(p) =
rmk − p
rik − p
(
p
rik − p
) 1
n−k−1
. (7)
The function g(p) is increasing for p < r
i
kr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
and is decreas-
ing for p > r
i
kr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
. Also note that when both fmk (p) > 0 and
f ik(p) > 0, (1 − Fmk (p))
n−1
n−k−1 can be written as a constant divided by g(p).
Because Fmk (p) should increase in p, a situation with both f
m
k (p) > 0
and f ik(p) > 0 requires p <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
. Because g(p1) = g(p2),
p1 <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
and p2 >
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
. This implies that for
prices above p2 either fmk (p) = 0 or f
i
k(p) = 0. Because p3 < r
m
k this
gives that there must be a p4 < rmk such that for p3 < p ≤ p4 f ik(p) > 0
and fmk (p) = 0 and that for p4 < p ≤ p5 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) = 0, with
p5 ≤ rmk . But Fmk (p3) = Fmk (p4) can be written as g(p3) = g(p4). Be-
cause p3 >
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
, g(p) is strictly increasing for p ≥ p3 and
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g(p3) = g(p4) cannot hold.
Now suppose that for p1 < p ≤ p2 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) = 0. If p2 = rmk ,
equilibrium type 3 holds. A situation with p2 < rmk cannot hold. To show
this suppose that p2 < rmk . It cannot be that for p2 < p ≤ p3 both fmk (p) > 0
and f ik(p) > 0, because (5) would then give F
i
k(p1) < F
i
k(p2). Thus, for
p2 < p ≤ p3, fmk (p) = 0 and f ik(p) > 0. Note that p3 < rmk as fmk (rmk ) > 0.
First suppose that for p3 < p ≤ p4 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) > 0. As mentioned
in the previous part, to ensure that Fmk (p) is increasing in p, it should
be that p4 <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
. Also, rewriting F ik(p1) = F
i
k(p2) gives
h(p1) = h(p2), with
h(p) =
rik − p
rmk − p
(
p
rmk − p
) 1
k−1
. (8)
The derivative of h(p) has the same sign as
rikr
m
k + p((k − 1)ct − rmk ).
If (k − 1)ct − rmk ≥ 0, then h′(p) > 0 and h(p1) = h(p2) cannot hold.
If (k − 1)ct − rmk < 0 then h(p) first increases in p for small p and de-
creases in p for large p. But h′( r
i
kr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
) > 0 and therefore for
p <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
h(p) increases in p. Because p1 < p2 < p4 <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
, h(p1) = h(p2) cannot hold. Consequently, it cannot hold
that for p3 < p ≤ p4 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) > 0.
Now suppose that for p3 < p ≤ p4 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) = 0. Then F ik(p1) =
F ik(p2) gives h(p1) = h(p2), with h(p) defined by (8), and F
m
k (p2) = F
m
k (p3)
gives g(p2) = g(p3), with g(p) defined by (8). As shown before, g(p2) = g(p3)
implies p2 <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
and p3 >
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
. But, as in the
previous paragraph, when p2 <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
, h(p1) = h(p2) cannot
hold.
When pm
k
> pi
k
and k < n− 1 only equilibrium type 1 can hold.
When pm
k
> pi
k
, (4) gives pi
k
= rik
(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γ+(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
. Also, there is a p1 > pik such
that for pi
k
≤ p ≤ p1 fmk (p) = 0 and f ik(p) > 0. Because f ik(rmk ) = 0, p1 < rmk .
First suppose that for p1 < p ≤ p2 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) > 0. I will show
that this gives mall shops an incentive to deviate. Note that p1 = pmk is
defined by (6); Fmk (p
m
k
) = 0. This gives
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g(pm
k
) =
(
(1− γ)µk
γ
1− xk
n− k
) 1
n−k−1 1− xk
n− k
k
xk
with g(p) defined by (7). Because for p1 < p ≤ p2 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) > 0,
p2 <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
(else (6) is decreasing in p). Also, g(p) is increas-
ing for p < r
i
kr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
. This implies that for pi
k
< pm
k
to hold,
g(pi
k
) <
(
(1−γ)µk
γ
1−xk
n−k
) 1
n−k−1 1−xk
n−k
k
xk
. Plugging in pi
k
= rik
(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γ+(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
and rewriting gives
rik
γ + (1− γ)µk 1−xkn−k
>
rmk
xk
k
1−xk
n−k (γ + (1− γ)µk xkk )
.
Using pi
k
= rik
(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γ+(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
in pimk (p
i
k
) = γpi
k
+(1−γ)µk xkk pik gives pimk (pik) >
(1−γ)µk xkk rmk = pimk (rmk ). Therefore mall shops have an incentive to deviate.
Now suppose that for p1 < p ≤ p2 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) = 0. If p2 = rmk ,
equilibrium type 1 holds. I will show that p2 < rmk gives mall shops an
incentive to deviate.
Suppose that p2 < rmk . Note that p1 = p
m
k
is defined by (3); Fmk (p
m
k
) = 0.
As before, this gives
g(pm
k
) =
(
(1− γ)µk
γ
1− xk
n− k
) 1
n−k−1 1− xk
n− k
k
xk
with g(p) defined by (7), g(p) increasing in p for p < r
i
kr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
and
g(p) decreasing in p for p > r
i
kr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
. If there is a price region
[pj , pj+1] with j ≥ 2 where fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) > 0, then pmk < pj+1 <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
because else (6) would decrease in p. If there is no such
region, then for p2 < p ≤ p3 fmk (p) = 0 and f ik(p) > 0. Also, because
fmk (r
m
k ) > 0, for p3 < p ≤ p4 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) = 0, with p4 ≤ rmk .
But then Fmk (p2) = F
m
k (p3) gives g(p2) = g(p3), and therefore p
m
k
< p2 <
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
. So in either case pm
k
<
rikr
m
k
(n−k)rik−(n−k−1)rmk
, g(p) is in-
creasing in [pi
k
, pm
k
] and pi
k
< pm
k
gives g(pi
k
) <
(
(1−γ)µk
γ
1−xk
n−k
) 1
n−k−1 1−xk
n−k
k
xk
.
As before, using this inequality, pimk (p
i
k
) > pimk (r
m
k ), giving mall shops an
incentive to deviate.
When k = n− 1 only equilibrium type 3 can hold.
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When k = n − 1, piik(p) = γp(1 − Fmk (p))n−1 + (1 − γ)µk(1 − xk)p. It has
already been shown that pm
k
< pi
k
cannot hold. Also pm
k
> pi
k
cannot hold,
because if pm
k
> pi
k
, piik(p
m
k
) > piik(p
i
k
). Therefore, in equilibrium pi
k
= pm
k
.
In equilibrium a price region in which fmk (p) = 0 (and consequently f
i
k(p) >
0) cannot occur. Suppose that for p ∈ [p1, p2] fmk (p) = 0. Then piik(p1) <
piik(p2), a contradiction.
Because pi
k
= pm
k
and f ik(r
m
k ) = 0, there should be a p1 < r
m
k such that for
pi
k
≤ p ≤ p1 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) > 0. Also, because fmk (p) = 0 cannot oc-
cur, there should be a p2 such that for p1 < p ≤ p2 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) = 0.
If p2 = rmk , equilibrium type 3 holds. If p2 < r
m
k , there should be a p3 such
that for p2 < p ≤ p3 fmk (p) > 0 and f ik(p) > 0. But because F ik(p) is given
by (5), F ik(p2) > F
i
k(p1), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
In this proof I will use that the definitions of rmk and r
i
k ((1) and (2)) can
be rewritten using partial integration as∫ rmk
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp = ce
and ∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp = ct + ce
• Recall that ct = β(ct + ce), so β → 0 implies ct → 0. Thus rik − rmk =
ct → 0.
In equilibrium type 1, piik(b) = pi
i
k(r
i
k) gives
bγ(1− F ik(b))n−k−1 =
1− xk
n− k (1− γ)µk(r
i
k − b).
Using that Fmk (b) = 0, or γb(1− F ik(b))n−k = (rmk − b)(1− γ)µxkk , we
get
(rmk − b)
xk
k
= (rik − b)
1− xk
n− k (1− F
i
k(b)).
Because rik − rmk → 0, it should be that xkk − 1−xkn−k (1 − F ik(b)) → 0.
Because xkk ≥ 1−xkn−k and 0 ≤ F ik(b) ≤ 1, it should be that xkk − 1−xkn−k → 0
and F ik(b)→ 0. But then
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∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp→ 0
and so equilibrium type 1 cannot hold. Note that equilibrium types 2
and 3 both have pi
k
= pm
k
.
Also note that µk should be strictly above 0. If µk → 0, both F ik(p)→ 1
and Fmk (p)→ 1. Moreover, pik → 0. Then
∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp = ce + ct gives
rik = ce + ct. But to have 0 < µk < 1, r
i
k = θ should hold, and
ce + ct < θ by definition, a contradiction.
In equilibrium type 2, pimk (b) = pi
m
k (r
m
k ) gives
γb(1−Fmk (a))k−1
(rik − b)(1− γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γb(1− Fmk (a))k
(1−F ik(b)) = (1−γ)µk
xk
k
(rmk −b)
or
(rik − b)
1− xk
n− k (1− F
i
k(b)) = (r
m
k − b)
xk
k
(1− Fmk (a)).
If xkk − 1−xkn−k does not approach 0, then F ik(b) < Fmk (a) and moreover
for p ≤ a F ik(p) < Fmk (p) (see (5) and (6)). But then∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp =
∫ a
pi
k
F ik(p)dp+
∫ b
a
F ik(p)dp+ (r
i
k − b)F ik(b) <
∫ a
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp+
∫ b
a
Fmk (a)dp+
∫ rmk
b
Fmk (p)dp =
∫ rmk
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp,
a contradiction.
Therefore, xkk − 1−xkn−k → 0, or xkk → 1n . But then for p ≤ a F ik(p) −
Fmk (p) → 0. Moreover, pimk (b) = pimk (rmk ) gives F ik(b) → Fmk (a). Com-
bining, this gives F ik(b)− F ik(a)→ 0. Because µk > 0 F ik(p) is strictly
increasing in p for a ≤ p ≤ b, and so b − a → 0. Because µk > 0,
Fmk (p) is strictly increasing for b ≤ p ≤ rmk . Therefore, if b < rmk ,∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp =
∫ a
pi
k
F ik(p)dp+
∫ b
a
F ik(p)dp+ (r
i
k − b)F ik(b) <
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∫ a
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp+ (b− a)Fmk (a) +
∫ rmk
b
Fmk (p)dp =
∫ rmk
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp.
Therefore, b→ rmk and F ik(p)→ Fmk (p).
In equilibrium type 3, if xkk − 1−xkn−k does not approach 0, then for
p ≤ b F ik(p) < Fmk (p) (see (5) and (6)). This gives
∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp <∫ rmk
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp, a contradiction. Therefore,
xk
k − 1−xkn−k → 0, or xkk → 1n .
But then for p ≤ b F ik(p) − Fmk (p) → 0. Moreover, because µk > 0,
Fmk (p) is strictly increasing for b ≤ p ≤ rmk and therefore if b < rmk∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp =
∫ b
pi
k
F ik(p)dp+ (r
i
k − b)F ik(b) <
∫ b
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp+
∫ rmk
b
Fmk (p)dp =
∫ rmk
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp,
a contradiction. This gives b→ rmk and F ik(p)− Fmk (p)→ 0.
• Note that β → 1 implies ce → 0. Also note that (3) and (6) give that
Fmk (p) is either strictly increasing in p or equal to 1. Because ce → 0,∫ rmk
pm
k
Fmk (p)dp→ 0, and this implies rmk − pmk → 0.
In equilibrium type 1 rmk − pmk → 0 gives rmk − b → 0. Note that b
is defined by Fmk (b) = 0, which gives (r
m
k − b)(1 − γ)µk xkk = γb(1 −
F ik(b))
n−k. Plugging in (4) for F ik(b) and simplifying gives
(rmk − b)
xk
k
= (rik − b)
1− xk
n− k
(
(rik − b)(1− γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γb
) 1
n−k−1
Because rmk − b → 0, this expression can only hold if µk → 0 or
1−xk
n−k → 0. In either case, F ik(p) → 1 (and therefore F ik(rmk ) → 1)
and pi
k
→ 0. Then ∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp → ct gives rik → ct and consequently
rmk → 0. To show that 1−xkn−k → 0, note that for µk < 1 it should hold
that rik = θ and that by definition ct < θ. Therefore µk → 0 cannot
hold and 1−xkn−k → 0 should hold.
In equilibrium types 2 and 3, pi
k
= pm
k
and therefore pi
k
→ rmk . Then∫ rik
pi
k
F ik(p)dp→ ct gives F ik(p)→ 1 and therefore F ik(rmk )→ 1.
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Note that Fmk (p
m
k
) = F ik(p
m
k
) gives xkk (r
m
k − pmk ) =
1−xk
n−k (r
i
k − pmk ), or
pm
k
=
xk
k r
m
k − 1−xkn−k rik
xk
k − 1−xkn−k
.
Because pm
k
→ rmk and rik = rmk + ct it should be that 1−xkn−k → 0. But
then pi
k
= rik
(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γ+(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
→ 0 and consequently rmk → 0.
• In all equilibria, pi
k
= rik
(1−γ)µk
γ
(1−xk)
(n−k)+(1−γ)µk
γ
(1−xk) . Note that p
i
k
< rmk =
rik − ct, therefore µk(1−xk)γ cannot go to infinity. This implies that
either xk → 1 or µk → 0, or both. Suppose that only xk → 1 holds.
In equilibrium type 1
Fmk (p) = 1−
(
rmk − p
p
) 1
k−1
(
(1− γ)µk xkk
γ
) 1
k−1
(
1
1− F ik(p1)
)n−k
k−1
.
Note that (1−γ)µk
xk
k
γ →∞, implying that all mass of Fmk (p) is concen-
trated at p = rmk . But then the definition of r
m
k , given by (1), cannot
hold.
In equilibrium types 2 and 3, for small enough prices
F ik(p) = 1−
(
rik − p
p
) 1
n−1 ((1− γ)µk
γ
) 1
n−1
( xk
k (r
m
k − p)
(rik − p)
) k
n−1
(
n− k
1− xk
) k−1
n−1
.
Note that both (1−γ)µkγ → ∞ and n−k1−xk → ∞. This implies that
pi
k
→ rmk and the definition of rik, given by (1), cannot hold.
Concluding, if only xk → 1 holds, no equilibrium type can hold, im-
plying that µk → 0.
• In all equilibria, pi
k
= rik
(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
γ+(1−γ)µk 1−xkn−k
. When γ → 1, pi
k
→ 0.
In equilibrium type 1, F ik(p) = 1− (
(rik−p)(1−γ)µk
1−xk
n−k
γp )
1
n−k−1 → 1. Be-
cause pi
k
→ 0 this gives rik → ct + ce and consequently rmk → ce. But
rmk → ce can only occur when pmk → 0 and Fmk (p)→ 1.
In equilibrium types 2 and 3, pi
k
= pm
k
and so pm
k
→ 0. Moreover,
taking the limits of (5) and (6) gives F ik(p)→ 1 and Fmk (p)→ 1.
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B Optimal consumer behavior
A first useful result is the following.
Proposition B.1 In equilibrium pimk > 0 and pi
i
k > 0. Consequently, p
m
k ≤
θ and pik ≤ θ.
Proof
Suppose to the contrary that pimk = 0 and pi
i
k > 0. This implies that p
i
k
> 0
because for pi
k
= 0 piik = pi
i
k(p
i
k
) = 0. If some of the non-shoppers visit the
shopping mall in their first search then for a shop in the mall setting a price
ce will prevent the non-shoppers from continuing search, leading to positive
profits, a contradiction. If none of the non-shoppers search in the shopping
mall shops in the mall compete for the shoppers, leading to a maximum
price of 0. But then non-shoppers would prefer to search in the shopping
mall, a contradiction.
The case pimk > 0 and pi
i
k = 0, with k ≤ n− 2 is the same as above, reversing
the roles of the shops inside and outside the mall. For k = n − 1, if the
isolated shop attracts some non-shoppers, it can make a profit by setting
p = ct + ce. If the isolated shop only attracts shoppers, it can make a profit
by setting a price slightly below pm
k
because pm
k
> 0.
This leaves the case pimk = 0 and pi
i
k = 0. If non-shoppers would search
then the shops attracting some non-shoppers could set a price ce and make
a strictly positive profit. If non-shoppers do not search the firms compete
for the shoppers and all set a price 0. But in that case non-shoppers would
find it optimal to search, a contradiction.
Because a price above θ would not lead to any sales, the profits of setting
such a price are 0, which contradicts the fact that in equilibrium profits are
strictly positive.
2
Using Proposition B.1 and assuming that pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik the behavior
of non-shoppers can be derived. This behavior depends on the prices found
in previous searches and on whether the consumer currently is in a shop
inside the shopping mall or whether he currently is in a shop outside the
shopping mall. First consider the case where the consumer currently is
in the shopping mall and let p˜mk denote the lowest price found on current
and previous searches in the shopping mall. Let p˜ik denote the lowest price
found on previous searches outside the shopping mall, with p˜ik = ∞ when
on previous searches no shops outside the mall have been visited. Note that
if the non-shopper decides to stop searching and p˜mk ≤ p˜ik + ct then he will
buy from the cheapest shop in the shopping mall, at price p˜mk (note that
p˜mk ≤ θ and therefore buying at p˜mk is a better strategy than not buying at
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all). If the non-shopper decides to stop searching and p˜mk > p˜
i
k + ct then he
will buy from the cheapest shop outside the shopping mall, incurring return
costs ct and buying at price p˜ik. In the proposition that follows I will use
the term ’buy from the cheapest option’ to denote this behavior.
Proposition B.2 Consider a non-shopper who expects pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤
rik and who currently is in a shop in the shopping mall.
When rmk ≤ rik (rmk > rik) his optimal behavior is as follows. Whenmin(p˜mk , p˜ik+
ct) ≤ rmk (min(p˜mk , p˜ik + ct) ≤ rik) stop search and buy from the cheapest op-
tion. When min(p˜mk , p˜
i
k + ct) > r
m
k (min(p˜
m
k , p˜
i
k + ct) > r
i
k) search further in
(outside) the shopping mall, if possible. If there are no shops left to search in
(outside) the shopping mall and min(p˜mk , p˜
i
k+ct) ≤ rik (min(p˜mk , p˜ik+ct) ≤ rmk )
buy from the cheapest option. If there are no shops left to search in (outside)
the shopping mall and min(p˜mk , p˜
i
k + ct) > r
i
k (min(p˜
m
k , p˜
i
k + ct) > r
m
k ) search
further outside (in) the shopping mall, if possible. If there also are no shops
left to search outside (in) the shopping mall buy from the cheapest option.
Now consider the case where the consumer currently is outside the shopping
mall and let p˘ik denote the price found in the current shop. Let p˜
i
k denote
the lowest price found on previous searches outside the shopping mall, with
p˜ik = ∞ when on previous searches no shops outside the mall have been
visited. Let p˜mk denote the lowest price found on previous searches inside
the shopping mall, with p˜mk =∞ when on previous searches no shops inside
the mall have been visited. Note that if the non-shopper decides to stop
searching and to buy and min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k+ct, p˜
m
k +ct) = p˘
i
k then he will buy from
the shop he currently is, at price p˘ik. If min(p˘
i
k, p˜
i
k+ct, p˜
m
k +ct) = p˜
i
k+ct then
he will buy from the cheapest shop outside the shopping mall visited before,
incurring return costs ct and buying at price p˜ik. If min(p˘
i
k, p˜
i
k+ct, p˜
m
k +ct) =
p˜mk + ct then he will buy from the cheapest shop inside the shopping mall,
incurring return costs ct and buying at price p˜mk . In the proposition that
follows I will use the term ’buy from the cheapest option’ to denote this
behavior.
Proposition B.3 Consider a non-shopper who expects pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤
rik and who currently is in a shop outside the shopping mall.
When rik ≤ rmk + ct (rik > rmk + ct) his optimal behavior is as follows. When
min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k+ct, p˜
m
k +ct) ≤ rik (min(p˘ik, p˜ik+ct, p˜mk +ct) ≤ rmk +ct) stop search
and buy from the cheapest option. When min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) > r
i
k
(min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k+ ct, p˜
m
k + ct) > r
m
k + ct) search further outside (in) the shopping
mall, if possible. If there are no shops left to search outside (in) the shopping
mall and min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) ≤ rmk + ct (min(p˘ik, p˜ik + ct, p˜mk + ct) ≤ rik)
buy from the cheapest option. If there are no shops left to search outside
(in) the shopping mall and min(p˘ik, p˜
i
k + ct, p˜
m
k + ct) > r
m
k + ct (min(p˘
i
k, p˜
i
k +
ct, p˜
m
k + ct) > r
i
k) search further in (outside) the shopping mall, if possible.
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If there also are no shops left to search in (outside) the shopping mall buy
from the cheapest option.
Proof
A complete proof of Propositions B.2 and B.3 is available on request. Here
I only give a short sketch of the proof.
Let h denote the number of shops that have not yet been searched, let hm
denote the number of shops in the mall that have not yet been searched and
let hi denote the number of isolated shops that have not yet been searched,
with h = hm + hi. The proof uses several induction arguments. First, it is
easy to see that both propositions hold when h = 0. A second step is to prove
that both propositions hold when hm = 1 and hi = 0. Using a standard
induction argument it can then be shown that both propositions also hold
for hi = 0 and hm > 1. A third step is to prove that both propositions also
hold when hm = 0 and hi = 1. Again using a standard induction argument
it can then be shown that both propositions also hold for hm = 0 and hi > 1.
These three steps together prove Propositions B.2 and B.3 for some corner
cases. These cases together form the basis of one final induction step. This
final step shows the following. If the propositions hold for h = x − 2 and
for h = x − 1 then the propositions also hold for h = x, with hm ≥ 1 and
hi ≥ 1. Because the propositions hold for h = 0 and h = 1, they will also
hold for h > 1, hm ≥ 1 and hi ≥ 1. Note that steps two and three have
already shown that the propositions hold for hm = 0, hi > 1 and for hi = 0,
hm > 1.
2
Propositions B.2 and B.3 specify the optimal behavior of non-shoppers when
they have searched at least one shop under the conditions pmk ≤ rmk and
pik ≤ rik. Proposition B.4 specifies the optimal behavior of non-shoppers
when they have not yet searched any shop.
Proposition B.4 Let shops price according to pmk ≤ rmk and pik ≤ rik.
If rik < r
m
k + ct (r
i
k > r
m
k + ct) non-shoppers prefer to first search an isolated
shop (shop in the mall) above first searching a shop in the mall (an isolated
shop). If rik < θ (r
m
k + ct < θ) all non-shoppers will search, if r
i
k = θ
(rmk + ct = θ) non-shoppers are indifferent between staying at home and
searching an isolated shop (shop in the mall) and if rik > θ (r
m
k + ct > θ) all
non-shoppers prefer to stay at home.
If rik = r
m
k + ct non-shoppers are indifferent between searching in an isolated
shop or in a shop in the mall. When rik < θ all non-shoppers will search,
when rik = θ non-shoppers are indifferent between searching and staying at
home and when rik > θ all non-shoppers prefer to stay at home.
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Proof
First look at the case rik = r
m
k + ct. If a non-shopper would start his search
in a shop in the mall he expects to find a price at or below rmk and as
Proposition B.2 shows the non-shopper thus expects to stop searching after
the first search. Expected utility of searching in the mall is
U(mall) = −ct − ce +
∫ rmk
pm
k
(θ − p)dFmk (p),
which can be rewritten as
U(mall) = −ct − ce + θ − rmk +
∫ rmk
pm
k
(rmk − p)dFmk (p) = θ − rmk − ct.
A non-shopper who starts his search in an isolated shop expects to find
a price at or below rik and as Proposition B.3 shows he expects to stop
searching after the first search. Expected utility is
U(isolated) = −ct − ce +
∫ rik
pi
k
(θ − p)dF ik(p),
which can be rewritten as
U(isolated) = −ct − ce + θ − rik +
∫ rik
pi
k
(rik − p)dF ik(p) = θ − rik.
Because rik = r
m
k + ct, U(mall) = U(isolated) and non-shoppers are indiffer-
ent between searching in an isolated shop or in a shop in the mall. When
rik < θ U(isolated) > 0 and all non-shoppers will search. When r
i
k = θ
U(isolated) = 0 and non-shoppers are indifferent between searching and
staying at home. When rik > θ U(isolated) < 0 and all non-shoppers prefer
to stay at home.
The proof for the cases rik > r
m
k + ct and r
i
k < r
m
k + ct follows the same
arguments, but is mathematically slightly more complicated because non-
shoppers sometimes expect to search twice instead of once. Details are
available on request.
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